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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“The very notion of equivalence allows for imprecise, subjective
comparisons that are not appropriate when dealing with issues as important
as public health and safety.” Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, February 20001
Even as the U.S. government is increasingly concerned about the vulnerability of the food supply
to bioterrorism and is being given new funds by Congress to shore up woefully inadequate border
inspection capacity for potentially contaminated food, U.S. government officials are faced with a
conflicting obligation contained in international trade agreements and enshrined in U.S. law – to facilitate
trade and the unimpeded flow of goods via international “equivalency” agreements. 
As a result, core requirements of U.S. food safety laws are being abrogated or amended in an
effort to facilitate trade. In other words, a handful of agency officials are accepting others nations’ food
safety policies as our own without congressional approval and often with little public notification and
involvement. Though the American public has every reason to assume that they are protected by laws
enacted by their elected representatives and enforced by administrative agencies in a publicly transparent
and participatory fashion, this is not necessarily the case. 
Equivalency is a fairly new concept in U.S. domestic law. The notion first arose in Europe in the
context of the Common Market integration where the principal of mutual recognition ensures the free
flow of goods across borders based on the recognition of differing national regulations as being equivalent
to each other.   This idea was later enshrined as a key obligation of several World Trade Organization2
(WTO) Agreements and in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Equivalency is
designed to allow foreign goods produced under different rules and regulations “free passage” into the
importing country’s market without reinspection at the border. Once a foreign system or an individual
foreign standard is declared “equivalent” to a domestic system or standard, products produced under that
system must be treated as if they were produced under the domestic system or standard, even though the
two systems may differ in significant ways. In other words, goods must be allowed entry that meet the
exporting country’s laws and regulations even if they do not precisely meet the standards of the
importing country. “Duplicative” border inspections are to be eliminated as the importing country relies
on the exporting country to ensure that the product meets equivalent standards.
To implement these WTO and NAFTA equivalency mandates, U.S. agencies including the Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as well as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) are all engaged in equivalency
determinations using a variety of differing policies and procedures, especially regarding public notice and
consultation.
Neither USDA, nor any other U.S. government agency engaged in trade-related equivalency
decisionmaking, has answered the fundamental paradox posed by this new trading concept: how can
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something that is different be the same? When it comes to important public health and safety standards,
most Americans would argue that “close” is simply not good enough.
The pressure for globalized agricultural trade is in large part being driven by the transnational
agribusiness companies that are interested in operating in other nations because of cheap labor and
production costs and weaker food safety and environmental regulations. As a publication by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Animal Plant Health Inspection Service states, “International commerce is
increasingly the result of more commercial activities than just exporting or importing. Most of the
top-ranked U.S.-based meat corporations are also investing overseas in processing or production. Market
access, lower production costs, growth opportunities, and regulation drive international location
decisions.”   The agency specifically points to lower labor and environmental compliance costs in nations3
like Mexico.   Meat industry giants such as Perdue Farms, Inc., Tyson Foods, Inc., Smithfield Foods,4
Conagra Foods, and Cargill, Inc. have all located plants abroad, many in order to send product right back
to the U.S. market under “equivalent” standards.   Because it is becoming an increasingly international5
enterprise,  the meat processing industry is interested in weakening governmental regulation of the
slaughter and processing of meat and poultry products at home and abroad.
While the U.S. still has better safety controls than many nations, the drive to reduce standards is
taking place in many arenas – from  attempts to privatize meat inspection in the U.S. to international
efforts to push third-party certification in lieu of government meat inspection and to globally harmonize
least-common-denominator standards or recognize weaker standards as “equivalent” for trade promotion
purposes.
While many U.S. agencies are engaged in equivalency decisions in a variety of food and product
areas,  FSIS, which regulates meat and poultry products, has gone the farthest in implementing the
equivalency trading dictates of NAFTA and the WTO. As a consequence this briefing paper focuses on
FSIS’ performance in this area. 
FSIS oversees a group of U.S. laws and regulations that were first initiated almost 100 years ago
to ensure the safety of the U.S. meat supply. Core elements of these laws include: mandatory sanitary
standards for the processing of meat products, including standards for wholesome, unadulterated meat;
enforcement by qualified federal meat inspectors whose impartiality is ensured by their status as
government employees; visual inspection of each carcass by federal inspectors working in slaughter and
processing plants; continuous inspection of slaughter and processing plants, meaning the presence of
federal inspectors at all hours of operation; legal authority to keep potentially unsafe meat off the market;
and more recently, sampling and microbial testing.6
FSIS first got its feet wet with equivalency with the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Under this agreement, the two nations’ meat inspection systems were declared equivalent and a
“streamlined” border inspection system was implemented. In February 1990, the two countries announced
that they would take this new system one step further and proposed a one-year experiment with an “open
border” which would eliminate all border inspections for meat imported from one country to another.  At7
the time, some FSIS officials interviewed by the Government Accounting Office questioned whether this
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move was in compliance with U.S. law on import inspection or whether it needed an act of Congress to
drop all border controls, but the experiment proceeded.  8
Shortly after U.S. and Canadian officials touted the agreement as “the first time in our countries’
history that we have been able to open our borders for food safety standards,” alarming warnings reached
Congress about the results. Bill Lehman, a U.S. meat inspector with 26 years of experience blew the
whistle on USDA for allowing contaminated Canadian meat into the country unchecked.   Jack Perrault,9
director of the International Import Inspection Service, condemned USDA for “giving up consumer
protection for free trade.”  The brouhaha generated a number of negative press reports and10
congressional investigations, prompting USDA to abandon its “open border” with Canada, although a
streamlined inspection system remains in effect between the U.S. and Canada to this day.11
In 1994, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act passed Congress. This bill made the U.S. part of
the WTO, and implemented key WTO agreements as binding federal law. In addition to rewriting large
swaths of U.S. law, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act made statutory changes to the Federal Meat
Inspections Act and the Poultry Products Inspection Act that in 1995 resulted in a minor, seemingly
insignificant change to the U.S. meat and poultry regulations, when the words “equal to” were replaced
with the word “equivalent.”  12
In other words, before the WTO, foreign meat inspection systems were required to produce meat
destined for export to the U.S. utilizing sanitary and quality standards the same as those of the United
States.  U.S. government inspectors had to certify that foreign processing plants met U.S. standards in
order for such a facility to send food to the U.S.  After the Uruguay Round Act, the meat industry in
foreign nations could maintain differing standards, certify their own plants for export, and still be eligible
to export into the U.S.   As explained by FSIS officials, “since 1995 the United States, along with other13
members of the World Trade Organization, has shifted its emphasis from ‘compliance’ with importing
country inspection requirements to ‘equivalence’ in conformance with our obligations under the [WTO
Sanitary and Phytosanitary] SPS Agreement,” which governs trade in food.  Another official states, “if14
you revert to ‘the same as,’ then there’s even arguably a higher standard and a more difficult challenge to
meet to gain entry [into U.S. markets].”15
Since 1995, FSIS has declared the meat inspection systems of 43 nations “equivalent” and eligible
to export fresh meat or processed meat products into the U.S., although not all of these countries are
currently exporting to the U.S. “Meat” is defined in U.S. regulation as product of cattle, sheep, swine and
goats, although the vast majority of imported meat is beef.   In addition, five countries have been found16
equivalent for the importation of poultry. Not surprisingly, the amount of imported meat and poultry has
grown, reaching over 4 billion pounds in 2002, an estimated 20% of the meat consumed in the U.S.  17
Moreover, the American consumer cannot distinguish these imports from meat produced under U.S.
standards. Unbeknownst to consumers, in the meat sections of grocery stores all over the U.S., there are
packets of beef and poultry bearing the USDA seal of approval that were produced in slaughterhouses
and processing plants abroad that are not required to obey the same rules as U.S. facilities and in which
no U.S. government inspector may ever have set foot. Yet, the appearance of the USDA grade stamp
(which marks beef “choice,”“prime” or “select”) on certain meat packages as well as the inspection
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 In May of 2003, a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease was1
discovered in Canada prompting the closing of the U.S. border to Canadian cattle and beef imports. 
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stamp for certain meats processed in the U.S. misleads many consumers to believe that the beef is
homegrown.  The lack of country-of-origin labeling is cause for concern, especially when one hamburger18
sold in the U.S. could potentially contain a veritable United Nations of meat as processors may mix beef
from many nations in one batch.
Equivalency decisions are being made by a small number of bureaucrats in U.S. federal agencies.
There is no congressional oversight of these decisions and information about how these decisions are
made is very hard to obtain. For three years, USDA has been stalling on a series of Freedom of
Information Act requests from Public Citizen and has attempted to charge the organization thousands of
dollars for information that should be publicly available regarding how USDA makes equivalency
decisions and how it addresses problems in other countries’ inspection systems uncovered during country
audits.
What does FSIS have to hide?
A review of those documents that are publicly available regarding equivalency decisions suggests
that FSIS has reason to be nervous about public scrutiny of its activities. This report documents a sloppy
ad hoc process for determining equivalency, so full of holes and omissions that U.S. consumers are
exposed to increased risk. 
In sum, Public Citizen found that under the WTO-required equivalency process: 
Equivalence Replaces Compliance: Instead of explaining to other countries how to comply with
U.S. standards, a handful of FSIS bureaucrats are now engaged in complex discussions about whether or
not varying technical standards and differing rules and regulations are “close enough” to U.S. rules to
provide the same level of protection for U.S. consumers as domestic inspection.
Nations Not Compliant with Core Food Safety Law & Regulations Were Found
“Equivalent:” FSIS repeatedly authorized meat imports from nations whose standards did not meet
U.S. regulatory requirements. When problems were discovered, FSIS gave countries a seemingly time-
unlimited opportunity to address them. For instance, in violation of U.S. requirements for government meat
inspection, Mexico was allowed to have company-paid meat inspectors year after year. Canada and the
U.S. still have not agreed that differing sanitary standards, such as those governing E. coli testing, are in
fact equivalent. Yet,  Mexican and Canadian meat still flows into the U.S. and is stamped with the USDA
seal of approval.  1
Paper Reviews Take Precedence Over Plant Inspections: Under equivalence, instead of
inspecting all plants seeking to export to the U.S. and officially certifying them for export, the U.S.
determines if a country’s meat inspection system is equivalent and then relies on regulators in other
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nations to inspect and approve plants as eligible to export to the United States.  U.S. auditors perform
“system” audits, which focus on reviewing documents describing a nation’s regulatory policy and sanitary
procedures rather than a physical audit of each plant. One FSIS official described this as a “dramatic
departure from the traditional audit approach”;  another said, “we used to approve plants, now we19
approve governments.”  As part of the system audit, U.S. inspectors visit a percentage of plants eligible20
to export and observe as foreign regulatory officials audit those plants. The percentage of plants inspected
varies widely, and has dropped to as few as 2% in Canada. In addition, plants are notified well in advance
of the inspection team’s arrival. Extensive problems with this system have already been documented. In
June 2000, the USDA Office of the Inspector General reported that six countries were determined to be
equivalent before on-site audits occurred and that agency bureaucrats, rather than audit teams and
technical experts, were driving equivalency decisionmaking.21
U.S. Relies on Exporting Country Regulators to Ensure the Safety of U.S. Imports: Under
equivalency, key food safety checks for meat to be consumed in the U.S. are turned over to regulators in
other nations. Not only does FSIS rely on these regulators to approve and inspect plants for export and to
test for microbiological hazards in slaughter and processing plants, but in the case of Canada, FSIS even
relies on Canadian inspectors to choose which carcasses are to be examined by U.S. inspectors at the
border without being taken off the truck.  The appropriateness of relying on the regulatory authority of22
other nations is called into question every time another coverup hits the papers, such as Britain’s
mishandling of the “mad cow” crisis, Argentina’s delay in reporting a foot and mouth disease outbreak,
the Belgian government’s coverup of dioxin-contaminated chicken, or even the recent outbreak of SARS
in China that was not immediately reported to international officials.  Unfortunately, when millions of23
dollars in potential business losses are at stake, consumer health and safety has not always been given
first priority.
Border Checks Fail to Keep Pace with Imports: FSIS has not dropped border checks of imported
meat from equivalent nations. However, the extremely small amount of meat that is physically examined
and the even smaller amount that is tested for microbial contamination may not be sufficient to ensure the
safety of imports, especially when it is USDA policy not to retain the meat, but to let it into commerce
while test results are pending.  In 1997, FSIS reported 75 full-time meat and poultry inspection workers24
at 200 facilities inspecting 2.5 billion pounds of meat and poultry – meaning each inspector monitored 33
million pounds of meat and poultry that year, or 91,000 pounds a day.  By 2001, the same number of25
inspectors monitored the import of 3.7 billion pounds of meat and poultry – increasing the per inspector
rate to 49 million pounds per year or 135,000 a day.   In 2003, the same inspectors will have to examine26
well-over 4 billion pounds. More resources and personnel are needed to maintain inspection rates that will
ensure consumer protection.
Shifting Away from Border Inspection Based on Plant Performance to Random Sampling:
In 2002, USDA announced that it had made changes to the Automated Import Information System
(AIIS), the computer system used to track and select meat and poultry imports for sampling at the border.
Limited information is available about the new system, making it difficult to assess potential strengths and
weaknesses. However, the system has been described as focusing on random sampling rather than
sampling based on the performance of exporting plants. USDA has also said it wants to adopt the same
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system that has been in use with Canada. The Canadian streamlined system has been sharply criticized as
generating inspection rates as low as two hundredths of one percent, idling border inspectors who have
the time and capacity to inspect more trucks than they are being assigned and not providing a true picture
of the performance of Canada’s inspection program.  One border inspector asserted “we could be27
inspecting much more product at no additional cost to the government or the consumer.”  Indeed, newly28
available numbers demonstrate a profound drop in border inspections when the streamlined system was
implemented for all meat imports in 2002. When the new system kicked in during the fourth quarter of
2002, it resulted in an astonishing 65% drop in the rate of meat and poultry inspected.29
FSIS Fails to Look at Broader Issues of Consumer Protection: Shockingly, FSIS has only
recently begun assembling the documentation necessary for evaluating other countries’ enforcement
policies and performance as part of an equivalency determination.  Even though Mexico reported zero30
prosecutions or investigations in 2001, and in 2002 failed to demonstrate that required corrective actions
had been taken, Mexico retains its equivalency status. Clearly a rigorous assessment of a nation’s actual
performance in enforcing its own standards must be part of any equivalency determination. Moreover,
FSIS does not require that trading partners have the same whistle blower protections as U.S. law. These
protections have benefitted the U.S. public countless numbers of times as government officials have
alerted consumers to the presence of harmful food and consumer products, corruption, and lax agency
oversight.  Nor does FSIS systematically examine the environmental practices of plants or the labor31
standards to which employees are subjected.
Denial of Equivalency is Cause for a WTO Challenge: FSIS officials have admitted that foreign
governments that are unhappy with an FSIS denial of equivalency have recourse to the WTO dispute
resolution process, where losing countries have the choice of either changing their policy or paying trade
sanctions.  Decisions by U.S. government officials in this matter are now subject to oversight by trade32
tribunals operating behind closed doors whose goal is to facilitate trade, not to safeguard the interests of
U.S. consumers. To date, the U.S. government has lost 33 of the cases filed against it at the WTO and
has won only two of the cases filed against it.  The WTO can impose millions of dollars in sanctions33
against any nation found to violate its trade-promotion rules.
U.S. Government Agencies Have Diverse Policies and Procedures for Equivalency: U.S.
agencies have developed diverse policies and procedures on equivalency, calling into questions the
fairness and consistency of the policies. However, what these policies have in common is a lack of
significant public consultation or even public access to information about the negotiations, undermining the
legitimacy of such equivalency agreements. FDA has been engaged in equivalency discussions for years
with the European Union (EU) in the context of a wide-ranging Veterinary Equivalency Agreement, yet
has no policy on equivalency or on public participation on equivalency decisionmaking. Agencies also have
different policies for public notification that equivalency is being considered or has been determined, and
in some instances no public notice of equivalency decisions will be given at all. For instance, in 1999,
USDA’s FSIS reviewed the new Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point meat inspection programs of
37 nations and declared 32 equivalent for meat importation purposes without giving advance notice to the
public or an opportunity for the public to comment on these decisions.
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Because FSIS has gone further than any other U.S. agency in embracing and implementing a
WTO equivalency policy, this paper will focus primarily on FSIS’ performance in this area. This paper
takes an in-depth look at publicly available FSIS documents regarding five of our top trading partners in
fresh meat and meat products: Australia, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. We selected these
nations because they are among our largest trading partners and because there were indications of
problems with the equivalency determinations for each of them. 
A review of the publicly available audits of the performance of these nations in the meat
inspection area reveals that regulatory systems that have been classified as equivalent by FSIS have not
always complied with core requirements of U.S. food safety policy. A review of the FSIS system audits
of these nations reveals that FSIS found to be “equivalent” systems with sanitary measures that differ
from FSIS policy, and in some cases, actually violate the express language of U.S. laws and regulation.34
For instance:
C The U.S. law requiring meat to be inspected by independent government officials was violated by
plants in Brazil and Mexico.
C U.S. regulations requiring monthly supervisory reviews by foreign government officials were
violated by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico. Canada and Brazil are requesting an
equivalency determination on this core requirement of U.S. regulation. Monthly reviews are vitally
important to remind the meat industry that the meat inspector who works the line in the plant is
backed by the weight of the government and to double check the work of meat inspectors on a
regular basis.
C Even though U.S. regulations require that a government official and not a company employee
sample meat for Salmonella contamination, USDA approved company employees performing
this task as part of equivalency determinations with Brazil and Canada.
C Even though U.S. regulations require government samples to be tested at government
laboratories, the U.S. approved testing by private labs as part of the equivalency determinations
with Brazil, Canada and Mexico.
C USDA’s sanitary and  zero tolerance policies for contaminants including feces, urine, and ingesta
(stomach contents) was violated by Australia, Canada and Mexico.
C Unapproved and/or improper testing procedures and sanitation violations have been re-identified
by FSIS year after year for Australia, Brazil, Canada and Mexico, but the countries have
retained their eligibility to export to the U.S. 
C After its regulatory system was designated equivalent, Mexico began using alternative
procedures for Salmonella and E. Coli that had never been evaluated by FSIS.
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C Australia and Canada were allowed to export to the U.S. while utilizing their own methods and
procedures for such matters as E. Coli testing, post-mortem inspection, monthly supervisory
reviews and pre-shipment reviews while awaiting a decision from FSIS on a request for an
equivalency determination on these standards.
C FSIS auditors and Canadian food safety officials continue to disagree about whether or not
particular measures have already been found “equivalent” by FSIS, yet Canadian meat exports to
the U.S. continued uninterrupted.
C The regulatory systems of Brazil and Mexico were rated equivalent even though the countries
pleaded insufficient personnel and monetary resources to explain their inability to carry out all
required functions. 
Because FSIS has refused to respond to Public Citizen’s Freedom of Information Act requests
for correspondence and other documentation regarding these equivalency decisions, it is impossible to
determine the current status of these issues and whether or not they have been resolved by regulators. 
This report documents that the increasing level of imports due to these equivalency
determinations, combined with foreign plant utilization of differing standards, the inadequate inspection of
foreign plants by U.S. auditors and minimal border checks of the ensuing product, have and will continue
to result in an abrogation of U.S. food safety standards. At a time when all governments must be more
vigilant about increased risk of food contamination due to higher levels of trade, and even the possibility of
terrorist biocontamination, government action is constrained by legally-binding trade promotion rules that
elevate the swift and unfettered importation of meat and other commercial products over all other
concerns. 
To address this unacceptable abrogation of U.S. food safety policy, Public Citizen recommends: 
C Congress must intervene to change the underlying law and regulation so that USDA once again
establishes that trading partners maintain the same standards as the U.S. to be eligible to export
food products into the U.S.  FDA must be given the similar authority to approve countries’ laws,
regulations and standards as compliant with U.S. standards for food production purposes and ban
product from countries that are not compliant.
C Congress must act to substantially increase border inspection activities. After the September 11,
2001 attacks, FDA and USDA received funds to increase border inspection activities. Yet, in
2003 FDA will only inspect 1.3% of food imports into the U.S., and recent changes in the USDA
border inspection program indicate that there has been a dramatic drop off, from an 18%
quarterly inspection rate to a 6% rate of inspection, deserving of congressional scrutiny and
investigation.
C USDA and FDA must be given more money for conducting rigorous overseas audits and the
follow-up that is necessary to instruct foreign regulators on U.S. food safety policies and
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procedures. FSIS’s six auditors are woefully inadequate number of staff to annually confirm the
equivalency status of 43 nations for fresh meat and five for poultry. FDA and USDA auditors
should resume the practice of inspecting and certifying every foreign plant shipping product to the
U.S. on an annual basis. 
C Congress and USDA should stop undermining the country-of-origin labeling (COOL)
requirements that were passed as part of the 2002 Farm Bill. They should act to promptly
implement the COOL provisions which are overwhelmingly supported by consumers who want
more information about the food on their plates, not less.
C Key WTO food and product agreements that inappropriately delve into regulatory issues via such
trade promotion mechanisms as equivalency must be pared back. If the same domestic regulatory
standard is applied to both domestic and imported food, the level of protection or enforcement is
something those living with the results must decide – there is no trade issue if there is no
discrimination. 
C The implementation of WTO-mandated equivalency mechanisms fundamentally undermines
domestic democratic decisionmaking regarding food safety policy. All federal agencies engaged
in international activities, must develop clear and consistent rules for public engagement in these
activities to give U.S. consumers a voice through a participatory public process during multi-year
negotiations and certainly before agreements are finalized. 
C In addition to requiring compliance and verification for imports, developed nations must live up to
their responsibility to assist developing nations with the financial and technical assistance needed
to secure the safety of their own domestic food supply as well as exports.
Public Citizen, July 2003
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I. INTRODUCTION: TRADE RULES POSE NEW CHALLENGES
FOR ENSURING THE SAFETY OF FOOD IMPORTS
In the era of globalization, nations struggling to protect their citizens from foodborne illness are
attempting to address multiple hazards with limited resources. Some of these hazards are well-understood.
Foodborne pathogens, such as E. Coli 0157:H7, Salmonella , and Listeria, threaten to make ever-
increasing numbers of people sick. As the New England Journal of Medicine argued succinctly, “with a
global food supply, we worry less about the possibility that Grandmother’s potato salad will affect 80% of
the people attending a church picnic than about the prospect that hundreds of thousands of people in many
countries will be exposed to a single contaminated product.”35
Other foodborne health threats with global impacts are less well understood. Scientists are still
debating the root cause of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad cow” disease, outbreak in the
United Kingdom in 1986. This disease, which started in cows before jumping to humans, still has not run
its course. The potential of the disease to spread to the far corners of the earth was only really understood
15 years after the outbreak and years after the export of British meat and cattle was halted, when it was
disclosed that Britain continued to ship potentially contaminated animal feed to over 80 countries around
the world.36
Bioterrorism is another new hazard to which the food safety community is only just beginning to
respond. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., governments are
accelerating their examination of vulnerabilities and beginning to shape a regulatory response. A
September 2002 report prepared by the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of
Sciences, caused a stir by documenting the multiple ways in which U.S. was vulnerable to agricultural
bioterrorism.  “It is not a matter of ‘if,’ but ‘when,’” said R. James Cook, a committee member from37
Washington State University.   38
Government officials, scientists and food safety groups not only fear the release into the U.S. of
devastating agricultural pests or animal diseases such as foot and mouth, they are also concerned about
the deliberate poisoning of food, such as ground beef, which has the potential to impact millions of
consumers. Even the poisoning of a small amount of food would create an atmosphere of fear and panic. 
Deliberate biocontamination of food has occurred before in U.S. history. For instance, in the
1980s, a cult poisoned salad bars with Salmonella bacteria sickening, 750 people in Oregon.  More39
recently, traces of ricin, a powerful and deadly poison derived from castor beans, were discovered in a
London apartment building in January 2003.  The Central Intelligence Agency and British security40
officials are investigating the possibility that the ricin was being developed to poison food meant for British
troops.41
At a hearing in Washington, D.C. shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Health and
Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson testified to a U.S. House of Representatives Committee
that he was “more fearful about [food safety] than anything else,” and that imports posed the highest
Public Citizen, July 2003
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risk.  In January 2002, FDA issued non-binding industry guidelines making recommendations to prevent42
bioterrorism at plants producing foods regulated by the FDA at home and abroad. Under the guidelines, it
is suggested that foreign and domestic plants take such steps as checking the immigration status of
employees, color coding uniforms to determine who should be in what section of the plant, using photo
IDs, inspecting employee lockers, cars and bags, and securing plant perimeters.  USDA issued similarly43
non-binding guidelines for U.S. plants, encouraging plants to “make a plan to manage risk,” screen hires,
secure perimeters, hazardous materials, energy and water sources and make sure that production inputs
such as feed and nutrients are safe.  44
In June 2002, the President Bush signed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act for products regulated by the FDA. For the first time, foreign and
domestic plants that produce FDA-regulated foods for the U.S. market (such as fruits, vegetables, eggs,
seafood, and dairy products) are subject to modest registration requirements.  In addition, the law45
requires importers to notify the FDA before bringing imports into the U.S. and allows the agency to
detain contaminated foods.  These modest measures are geared more toward tracing back a product46
once a problem is found than seriously attempting to prevent a problem from crossing the border.
In the face of these increasing threats, nations struggling to protect their citizens from foodborne
illness are also faced with numerous challenges. Some of these challenges, such as industry pressure to
weaken long-standing regulations and stymie new ones, are well-established. The food industry, with its
army of lawyers and lobbyists plus millions in campaign contributions, fights the adoption of food safety
controls in the courts, at government agencies and in Congress. Nothing deters them from the path of
least regulation, not even the threat of a catastrophic bioterror incident. 
For instance, the Washington Post reported last year that food “industry lobbyists persuaded
lawmakers to water down or drop proposals from bioterrorism bills that would have substantially
enhanced the FDA’s authority over domestic and foreign food processors.”  Industry is even adverse to47
a thorough examination of potential risks. For instance, a lobbyist for the National Food Processors
Association expressed optimism to the Associated Press that the industry would be able to kill a proposed
study in the Senate version of the Homeland Security Bill which would examine the deliberate rather than
accidental contamination of food.  The study was not included in the final legislation signed by President48
Bush. 
At the same time the food processing and meat industries are fighting to prevent further
regulations in the food safety area, they are pushing an expensive, controversial technology of food
irradiation as a solution for foodborne illness and agricultural pests. This year, the industry pushed hard to
get the U.S. government to purchase irradiated ground beef for the national school lunch program, and in
October 2002, APHIS allowed imported fruit and vegetables to be irradiated for pests.  49
In addition to the well-established challenges posed by industry self-interest, governments are
increasingly facing tremendous pressure from trading partners who have been given new rights contained
in legally-binding trade agreements to demand the weakening or elimination of food safety measures and
the preclusion of new ones.
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In 1993, Congress passed NAFTA, a comprehensive international trade and investment
agreement covering Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act making the U.S. part of the now 145-member WTO which enforces dozens of different
trade agreements, many of which constrain the domestic regulatory policies of signatory countries. Both
pacts contain binding regulatory obligations, adopted into U.S. federal law by merit of congressional
approval of the agreements. Taken in combination, the agreements not only give our trading partners new
legal grounds to attack domestic laws and procedures as trade barriers, but constitute a deregulatory
superstructure which undermines strong domestic policies to protect the food supply from pathogens and
contaminants. NAFTA and the WTO are based on certain premises: 1) that domestic regulations should
be constructed in the least trade restrictive manner possible; 2) that domestic standards should be
“harmonized” (made to conform with international standards) or found to be “equivalent” (determined to
be different, but “close enough” to a domestic standard) to facilitate cross border trade; 3) that domestic
regulations not conforming to NAFTA or WTO constraints can be subject to challenge as barriers to
trade in the powerful and binding dispute resolution bodies contained in these agreements. Countries that
lose a NAFTA or WTO challenge must change the offending law or government action or face
significant trade sanctions as a penalty. 
These binding legal obligations empower U.S. trading partners to press for the elimination of U.S.
regulations and standards they don’t like and to interfere in the promulgation of new ones. Thus, it is not
surprising that numerous U.S. trading partners wasted no time in informing the U.S. that they viewed the
modest registration requirements contained in the FDA’s bioterrorism legislation as potentially WTO-
illegal barriers to trade. Argentina questioned whether the measures adopted by the FDA were consistent
with U.S. obligations under the WTO’s food and product agreements.  The Swiss reminded the U.S. of50
their WTO obligations to pursue the least trade restrictive option available and challenged the prior notice
requirement as discriminatory under trade law because it applied to foreign plants, but not to U.S. plants.51
The EU charged that the registration requirement “would involve a major administrative burden and would
create a serious barrier to trade.”  They requested that the U.S. provide for their review the WTO-52
required risk assessment which justified the measures taken, and suggested that some of the provisions of
the law also contradicted the 1999 U.S.-EU Veterinary Equivalency Agreement.  Most significantly, the53
EU asked the U.S. to clarify how the increased border checks of food called for in the Bioterrorism Act
aligned with the U.S. commitment to reduce border checks under the Veterinary Equivalency
Agreement.54
Just at a time when the U.S. government should be strengthening border controls, it is coming
under a barrage of pressure to drop such controls to conform with international harmonization and
equivalency obligations imposed in trade agreements. Whether the U.S. will give way to these pressures
is yet to be seen. The U.S. itself is a leading promoter of these international trade rules, and rarely fails to
complain if a trading partner develops a food safety measure it believes goes beyond WTO or NAFTA
constraints (as was evidenced by the recent filing by the U.S. of a WTO complaint against the EU’s
policy on genetically engineered food and crops). In the end, if U.S. trading partners believe the new
bioterrorism rules are more burdensome than necessary to achieve a WTO-permitted goal, they now have
the option of challenging these new laws as a barriers to trade in the binding dispute resolution systems of
the WTO or NAFTA.
Public Citizen, July 2003
4
There are three main sections to this briefing paper. In the first part, we review the concept of
equivalency in international law and give a brief overview of U.S. agency procedures involving
equivalency paying particular attention to agencies spotty performance in including giving public notice of
equivalency negotiations and decisionmaking. In the second part, we focus on the performance of FSIS
which, unlike other federal agencies, jumped into equivalency decisionmaking with an enthusiasm
unparalleled by other federal agencies in the mid-1990's. We end with conclusions and recommendations.
These sections are followed with three appendices: Appendix A – covering new internationally
harmonized equivalency rules being developed at the U.N. food standards body, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission in Rome, at the behest of the WTO which could have a profound impact on U.S. policy in
this area; Appendix B –  illustrating the diversity of agency procedures involving equivalency
decisionmaking; and, Appendix C – which is a model Administrative Procedures Act policy for notifying
the public of agency involvement in international equivalency and harmonization negotiations and rule
making activities.
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II. EQUIVALENCY IN CONTEXT
When NAFTA’s implementing legislation and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act passed
Congress in the early 1990s, huge swaths of U.S. domestic laws and policy were rewritten in one fell
swoop. Because the agreements were passed under the special requirements of the “Fast Track” trade
voting procedure, Congress was only allowed limited time to read, debate and vote on the lengthy bills.
Because no amendments are allowed to Fast-Tracked trade bills, even the members of Congress who
noticed and understood the arcane details, such as the harmonization and equivalency requirements, had
no ability to fix the provisions that troubled them. After almost ten years of implementation of these pacts,
we are reaching a point where we can begin to assess agency performance in executing the trade
facilitation provisions required by these agreements and their implementing legislation.
NAFTA and the WTO both oblige member governments to make equivalency an aspect of their
domestic regulatory systems. For instance, Article 4.1 of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Agreement, which sets criteria that WTO nations must follow regarding policies designed to protect
human, animal or plant life from pests, diseases and toxins in food, beverages, or animal feed states that,
“Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent, even if
these measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members trading in the same product if
the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures achieve the
importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”   Similarly, Article 2.7 of55
the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, which sets parameters for WTO signatory
countries’ domestic standards for non-food products, states “Members shall give positive consideration to
accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their
own...”  56
Under these pacts, use of equivalence is mandatory. A WTO member country “shall accept”
another member country’s food safety measures if the exporting country demonstrates that its standards
achieve the importing country’s appropriate level of protection.  Although the importing country makes57
the determination of equivalency, denial of equivalency can be challenged as a barrier to trade in the
powerful dispute resolution system of the WTO.  This has happened before. In 1993, for instance, a58
trade tribunal operating under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (the precursor to NAFTA) forced
Puerto Rico to accept Canadian “ultra-high temperature milk” in an equivalency challenge regarding
Puerto Rico’s requirements that milk be pasturized, even though the government of Puerto Rico did not
think the milk met the standards of its Pasturized Milk Ordinance.59
Once “equivalence” is agreed to, the standards of the exporting party apply. In other words,
different regulatory standards for the same food product exist at the same time, both of which are
considered legal in the U.S. One set of standards has been adopted by a U.S. regulatory agency to
implement a U.S. law enacted by Congress. Citizen input into these standards has been assured by an
array of U.S. laws including: the Administrative Procedure Act,  requiring public notice and opportunity60
for public comment on proposed regulations or regulatory changes; the Freedom of Information Act,61
permitting citizen access to the records of government agencies; the Government in the Sunshine Act,62
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ensuring that important agency meetings are publicly noticed; and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,63
requiring balanced representation on government advisory committees. Compliance with the U.S.
standards by producers of the affected product is secured through the monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms of U.S. law. 
In sharp contrast to this consultative democratic process, an “equivalent” set of standards has
been agreed to by the U.S. regulatory agency at the request of a foreign country on the basis of a claim
that the foreign country’s standards promulgated under its own domestic procedure achieve the same
level of protection as the standards that the U.S. agency itself has selected after consideration of the
opinions of its own experts, representatives of public interest groups, industry and academia, and the
affected public.
In addition to equivalency, there is another NAFTA and WTO-required trade facilitation
mechanism that significantly affects domestic regulatory standards. In addition to calling for equivalency
agreements, NAFTA and the WTO both oblige member governments to base their domestic standard-
setting on specified international standards and on international standard-setting techniques. For example
the WTO SPS Agreement requires that countries “base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures [food
standards] on international standards, guidelines or recommendations,”  and specifically recognizes the64
standards set by the U.N. food standards body, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) in Rome as
the world’s presumptively trade-legal standards.
 This process is called “harmonization” by its proponents, and is especially relevant to this briefing
paper because of a current proposal to create internationally harmonized standards for determining food
equivalency at the Codex. This effort has been sanctioned by the WTO and is aimed at encouraging
nations to develop the exact same procedure for determining equivalency and discouraging the diversity of
procedures that a democratic, participatory process in different countries might create.
Final action on the Codex equivalency policy is slated for July 2003. Given that NAFTA and the
WTO elevate Codex standards to a new role as the world’s presumptively trade-legal standards and as a
point of reference in any WTO dispute regarding food safety, a Codex equivalency policy could have a
significant impact on any domestic food equivalency policy developed by U.S. agencies which regulate
food.  Exporting nations denied food equivalency decisions by importing nations could use the Codex
policy as ammunition in a WTO dispute, making a nation’s process for determining equivalency itself a
WTO adjudicable issue, over and above whatever other conflicting sanitary measures may be the cause
of the trade friction. For more information on this complex topic and the Codex policy, please see
Appendix A of this report.
U.S. agencies are struggling to implement these equivalency and harmonization mandates.
Agencies are developing differing procedures for making equivalency decisions and widely differing
processes for including the public in this decisionmaking.
The agencies with the primary responsibility for food safety in the U.S. are the USDA’s FSIS,
which regulates meat, poultry and processed eggs, and the FDA, which regulates all other food, shell eggs
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and contaminants in animal feed and drugs and drug residues in animals for human consumption.  In65
addition, both FDA and the Environmental Protection Agency have a role in regulating pesticides and
genetically engineered foods.  USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates66
animal welfare, animal imports and has responsibility for protecting against agricultural pests and
diseases.  The new National Organic Program (NOP), which went into effect in October 2002, is also67
regulated by USDA.  68
Each of these agencies is currently considering or negotiating equivalence determinations on an
array of issues. With regard to equivalency decisionmaking, each agency has differing legal requirements,
policies, procedures and plans for incorporating public comment. 
More information is available about agency performance in involving the public in equivalency
decisionmaking in Appendix B of this report. To summarize briefly: 
C FDA is required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to pursue formal notice and comment
rulemaking when engaged in equivalency decisionmaking in the food safety area. Yet, in 1999,
FDA and other U.S. agencies signed onto a Veterinary Equivalency Agreement with Europe
covering over 40 product areas without giving  prior public notice of the agencies’ plans to
participate in the agreement. Additionally,  FDA issued a proposed rule containing a draft
equivalency policy in 1997 but has never finalized this policy as a formal, binding rule. Instead, it
has actively pursued the development of the internationally harmonized equivalency rules at the
Codex and intends to rely on that international policy in an undefined manner.
C In 1999, USDA issued an equivalency policy after a public comment period, but never issued the
policy as a formal binding rule. In a public meeting on the policy, USDA explained that it would
give formal notice in the Federal Register of “initial” determinations of equivalency (tracking its
long-standing practice of listing countries eligible to export to the U.S. in the Code of Federal
Regulations). However, the agency stated it would not give notice of “continuing” equivalency
determinations unless there was a major new development in an exporting nation’s program.
Thus, in December 1999 USDA approved 32 nations as having equivalent Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point Programs for controlling microbial contamination, but never publicly noticed
these complex negotiations in advance.
C USDA also runs the National Organic Program (NOP) which contains provisions allowing for
equivalency determinations between nations. This is particularly ironic with regard to the NOP as
it was developed to eliminate the “patchwork” of differing regulations between U.S. states.
Having eliminated one patchwork of varying procedures and standards, the regulation’s
equivalency terms facilitate the creation of a new, international patchwork of differing standards
which can be declared “equivalent” and still receive the same U.S. “organic” label. The National
Organic Standards Board has stated its intention of giving public notice of equivalency prior to
making any equivalence decision in a non-binding policy document.
Public Citizen, July 2003
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C APHIS was a leader in the development of the 1999 U.S.-EU Veterinary Equivalency
Agreement, yet apparently has no formal or informal publicly available policy on equivalency.
APHIS is also engaged in judging foreign food irradiation facilities equivalent and therefore
eligible to irradiate food destined for the U.S. market to eradicate insects and pests. 
It is worth mentioning for comparison purposes that the National Highway Transportation and
Safety Administration (NHTSA), which is engaged in determining the equivalence of individual foreign
car safety standards to U.S. standards under the WTO’s TBT agreement (which governs trade in non-
food products), has developed a formal process contained in a binding agency rule on how it will engage
in harmonization and equivalence determinations involving a single standard (such as a windshield wiper
standard), while other U.S. regulatory agencies are operating with informal, non-binding equivalence
policies involving multiple standards, and some agencies have no policy at all. The diversity of procedures
and processes being followed by agencies in this area is itself a problem, providing consumers and the
public with little assurance that equivalency decisions are being made in a comprehensive, uniform,
predictable and publicly-accessible fashion. 
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III. FSIS ACCEPTS FOREIGN REGULATORY SYSTEMS AS
EQUIVALENT
“FSIS’ process for evaluating the equivalency of foreign meat and
poultry food regulatory systems is both path breaking and precedent-
setting. No other food regulatory system in the world, to our knowledge,
is actively engaged in applying the concepts of equivalence to the degree
and extent as is FSIS. The matter of exactly how an importing country
judges, and determines equivalence is controversial. The world is
watching how FSIS carries out its equivalency process.”  Food Safety69
and Inspection Service 
“Equivalency is a method by which nations can create exemptions to each
other’s food safety laws to advance trade.”  Center for Science in the Public70
Interest
FSIS’ “precedent-setting” experiment with the concept of equivalence in the area of meat
inspection is particularly instructive, both because of the scale on which it has been implemented and
because of the gravity of the potential harm to the public if proper safety standards are not followed. 
A. THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEAT SAFETY
The current U.S. meat inspection system dates back to 1906 and retains the basic elements that
were adopted then in response to the public’s demand for reform following publication of Upton Sinclair’s
famous exposé of conditions in slaughterhouses, The Jungle. The 1906 Federal Meat Inspection Act
instituted sanitary standards for slaughter and processing plants, mandated antemortem and post-mortem
USDA inspection of every carcass, and required continuous USDA inspection of slaughter and
processing plants.  The 1957 Poultry Products Inspection Act added similar requirements for poultry into71
U.S. law. In 1967 the enforcement authority of USDA was strengthened by the Wholesome Meat Act,
which added prohibitions against adulteration and misbranding.  72
FSIS regulations prohibit contamination with fecal material, ingesta (stomach contents), urine, bile,
hair, dirt or other foreign matter and the agency enforces a “zero tolerance” policy for these
contaminants.  In 1994, following the outbreak of E. Coli 0157:H7 that killed four people and sickened73
hundreds who had eaten contaminated meat at Jack-in-the-Box restaurants, USDA classified E. Coli
0157:H7 as an adulterant and instituted a sampling program to test for the deadly pathogen.74
Enforcement of FSIS’ legal authority to keep unsafe meat off the market begins with the filing of
“Noncompliance Report” (NRs) by government inspectors working in slaughter and processing
establishments.   If violations reported in these forms are not corrected, FSIS has the authority to75
implement a progressively more intensive range of sanctions, from issuance of a Notice of Intended
Enforcement Action (NOIE), to suspension or withdrawal of its inspectors, which prevents sale of meat
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from the affected plants, to civil seizure of meat and imposition of criminal penalties.  From October 1,76
2002 to December 31, 2002 there were 31, 718 NRs; 17 NOIEs were issued to large plants; 50 NOIEs to
small plants; 57 NOIEs to very small plants; five suspensions of inspection in large plants; 35 suspensions
in small plants and 48 suspensions in very small plants.   FSIS does not have the power to order recalls,77
though it may recommend them and monitors and announces those that the industry institutes voluntarily.78
In 1996, USDA added regulatory provisions requiring slaughter and processing plants to develop
and implement Sanitation Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs) and process controls known as
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) plans.   At the same time, a microbial testing79
system was established under which slaughter plants are required to test for generic E. coli at set
sampling and testing frequencies in order to demonstrate compliance with the FSIS “zero tolerance”
standard for fecal contamination.  As an additional safeguard, FSIS itself tests for Salmonella in80
slaughter facilities and in plants that produce raw ground meat.   81
The HACCP program has proven to be extremely controversial. In the U.S., meat inspectors
have charged that in many plants it has been treated as a substitute for, instead of an addition to, direct
inspection requirements, with the result that food safety has been compromised.   There have been a82
mounting number of recalls in the years since HACCP was instituted. Between 1994 and 2001, FSIS
announced food recalls have risen by more than fivefold, from about 5 million pounds in 1994 to 315
million pounds in 2001.  Meat and poultry recalls are so common that they are increasingly ignored by83
consumers. In 2000, a pilot project initiated by USDA that explicitly attempted to “privatize” inspection in
slaughter plants by reducing the role of government inspectors was unambiguously rejected by the U.S.
Federal Court of Appeals in the case of American Federation of Government Employees v. Glickman,
which held that “[d]elegating the task of inspecting carcasses to plant employees violates the clear
mandates of the FMIA [Federal Meat Inspection Act] and PPIA [Poultry Products Inspection Act].”84
The core requirements of U.S. law remain unchanged and include:
C Mandatory sanitary standards for slaughter and meat processing;
C Inspection of slaughter and processing plants performed by meat inspectors whose impartiality is
ensured by their status as government employees;
C Continuous inspection of operations, meaning the presence of federal inspectors in plants during
all hours of operation;
C Visual inspection by inspectors of each carcass;
C Sampling and microbial testing;
C Legal authority to keep potentially unsafe meat off the market; and,85
C U.S. law requires whistle blower protections for federal meat inspectors.
 
Prior to adoption of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, FSIS had detailed procedures in
place governing eligibility to export meat to the U.S.  Foreign meat inspection systems were required to
have laws and regulations, and sanitary and quality standards, identical to those of the U.S., including
those requiring government meat inspectors.   In addition, all foreign inspection systems were required to86
conduct “supervisory” visits to each establishment certified as eligible to export meat to the U.S., no less
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frequently than once a month as a backup check to ensure that the regulatory requirements were being
met.  To ensure compliance with U.S. standards, FSIS itself conducted the actual audits of foreign87
slaughter and processing establishments certifying them as eligible to export to the U.S.,  and FSIS staff88
was frequently stationed in the other countries.   89
B. FSIS ADOPTS WTO EQUIVALENCE RULES
However, shortly after the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, in 1995 FSIS
amended its meat and poultry import regulations stating that “[u]nder this new law, drafted to comply with
GATT, the United States can no longer require foreign countries wishing to export meat and poultry
products to have meat and poultry inspection systems that are ‘at least equal’ to those in the United States
....”  All other provisions of the U.S. regulations remained the same. Thirty-seven countries that had90
previously been found to meet the “equal to” standard were grandfathered in and immediately declared
“equivalent.”  When the HACCP and pathogen reduction regulations were adopted in 1996, FSIS91
became responsible for determining these 37 countries’ “equivalent” with regard to the new HACCP
program.
 
In order to be classified as “equivalent,” a country must be found by USDA to have a regulatory
program administered by its national government that implements standards equivalent to those of the
U.S. meat inspection system in the following areas: uniform enforcement; ultimate control by the national
government; competent, qualified inspectors; authority to certify or refuse to certify meat intended for
export; adequate technical and administrative support; and inspection, sanitation, quality, species
verification, and residue standards.  The country’s legal authority must impose equivalent requirements92
for antemortem and post-mortem inspection; official control of establishments; direct and continuous
official supervision of slaughtering and preparation of product; separation of certified establishments from
uncertified ones; sanitation requirements; control over condemned product; and HACCP system.93
According to the regulatory requirements, maintenance of eligibility is dependent on the results of periodic
reviews conducted by FSIS.  In order to ensure that its requirements are being met, the regulations94
require that foreign regulatory system must conduct supervisory inspection visits to establishments eligible
to export least once a month (these are the so-called “monthly supervisory reviews”) and write up the
results and must perform random sampling in accordance with sampling and analytical techniques
approved by FSIS.   Moreover, once a country’s system is declared equivalent, that nation’s government95
becomes responsible for approving plants interested in exporting to the U.S., not U.S. auditors. U.S.
auditors will then annual inspect only a small sample of these plants as part of the systems audit they are
supposed to conduct on an annual basis.
 
In March 1999, FSIS publicly announced a policy and a process for determining equivalence and
invited comment in the Federal Register.  The three parts of the equivalency process include document96
analysis, on-site system audit and port-of-entry reinspection.  FSIS officials stated at a public meeting97
that it would use this process for both initial equivalency determinations and continuing eligibility
determinations, which are “generally” made on an annual basis,  and that it would use two “generic98
criteria” to evaluate all alternative sanitary measures: (1) Does the alternative measure “comport with”
USDA requirements for the import of meat and poultry products to the U.S.; and (2) Does the alternative
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measure afford U.S. consumers the same level of public health protection as is provided by USDA
domestic measures?99
Pathogen Reduction/HACCP Equivalence: At a public meeting on December 14, 1999, with no
prior public notice of its intentions to declare nations equivalent, FSIS announced that 32 of the 37
countries already approved for shipping meat products to the U.S. had been determined to have
“equivalent” pathogen reduction and HACCP systems in place.  Paraguay was at that time suspended100
(for unsanitary establishment conditions and for failing to implement E. coli requirements), and four
countries, Guatemala, Honduras, Slovenia and the Dominican Republic, voluntarily delisted all their
certified export establishments.  FSIS announced that 36 countries had adopted FSIS’ Sanitation101
Standard Operating Procedure (SSOP) requirements; that 32 had adopted FSIS’ HACCP requirements;
that 18 had adopted FSIS’ E. coli testing requirements, with 13 adopting different testing requirements,
which FSIS had found to be equivalent;  and that of the 27 countries to which the Salmonella testing102
regulations were applicable, eight had adopted FSIS’ requirements, with 19 adopting different measures
which FSIS had found to be equivalent.  In addition, it is notable that one country, the Netherlands,103
decided to use an altogether different microbiological indicator of contamination, testing for
enterobacteriaceae not Salmonella. This departure from U.S. regulation was also defined as “equivalent”
by FSIS staff.  104
Although the federal regulations require that FSIS employees conduct Salmonella testing and
send the test samples to government labs, FSIS revealed at the meeting that other countries’ export
establishments could use private laboratories for this purpose if the laboratories met certain criteria.  105
This departure from U.S. federal regulatory requirements did not go through notice and comment
rulemaking prior to its adoption by the agency. Ten countries allow their meat processing establishments
to take samples, 12 countries’ systems use private laboratories.  FSIS explained at the meeting, “We106
don’t, or we are not in a position to, dictate that you must [use a government laboratory]. That is the way
we operated before 1994. If we had these requirements prior to then, it would have been rather simply
put, it’s got to be government labs, its got to be government people selecting the samples.”107
The December 14, 1999 meeting was notable for two other reasons. First, because FSIS staff felt
confident in undertaking such a massive comparison of nations for pathogen reduction and HACCP with
no public notice or opportunity for public comment. Yet, as noted above, FSIS’ own policy is to give public
notice regarding renewals of countries declared equivalent when nations make significant changes to their
system. It is difficult to imagine a more significant change that required for each nation to develop a fully
functioning HACCP system. Secondly, FSIS also revealed that rather than requiring the exporting country
to provide documents in English, the agency spent over $550,000 on translation costs.  Other federal108
agencies, such as the FDA in the context of similar multinational agreement (the U.S.-EU Mutual
Recognition Agreement for pharmaceuticals and medical devices), have insisted that nations requesting
equivalency bear the burden of translation costs.
On-Site Audits: Instead of directly inspecting foreign establishments as it did before the 1995
adoption of the “equivalence” mandate, FSIS now relies on “system  audits” to determine whether an
exporting country’s regulatory system can be declared “equivalent” to that of the U.S. Six FSIS auditors,
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who are veterinarians, are responsible for conducting all foreign country audits.  Each audit can take from
two to six weeks.   Although since the September 11, 2001 attack, USDA has received new funds to109
ensure the security of the food supply, it is unclear how much of that money has gone to import inspection
and auditing.  Despite an ever-increasing volume of meat and poultry imports as of March 2003, the
number of auditors remains the same as in 1996 – six.  110
In conducting annual “system  audits,” FSIS auditors translate and analyze documents and data,
meet with exporting country inspection officials, and accompany the foreign country officials on-site as
they inspect usually a small sample of the plants that are approved by foreign governments as eligible to
export to the U.S.  Once a system has been declared “equivalent,” FSIS relies on the other country’s111
regulatory officials to conduct the ongoing inspection and monitoring of the establishments in which
animals are slaughtered and meat is prepared for export to the U.S. The number of eligible plants that are
actually visited by an FSIS auditor as part of the annual system audit varies widely and can be as few as
nine out of 513 certified establishments, which is the case in Canada.  As explained by Sally Stratmoen,112
Acting Director, Equivalence Division, FSIS’ Office of International Affairs: “We used to approve plants.
Now we approve governments.”  113
Port-of-Entry Reinspections: Port-of-entry reinspections consist of visual inspection of all
imports for transportation damage, proper packaging, labeling, certification, general condition and accurate
count.  and more in-depth testing of a subset based on a frequency determined by FSIS’ automated114
system.  The frequency of reinspection used to be based on plant performance. In other words, plants115
with a history of violations were targeted for more in-depth border scrutiny. However, in a 2002 news
release, FSIS announced that it was switching to a “new statistically-based sampling program based on
the annual volume of shipments.”  Under the new sampling program, product and percentages were116
slated to vary dramatically according to export volume, with nations exporting a smaller amount to the
U.S. receiving more scrutiny and nations exporting larger amounts receiving less.  117
New data from the last quarter of 2002 indicates for the first time how this system is working.
The data shows a precipitous drop both in the rate of inspection and the number of pounds of beef
rejected at the border. When the new system kicked in during the fourth quarter of 2002, it resulted in a
65% drop in the rate of meat and poultry inspected from the previous quarter.  Up until that point, FSIS118
regularly inspected approximately 200 million pounds of meat at the border each quarter and rejected 2 to
3 million pounds per quarter, maintaining an average inspection rate of 18%.   In the last quarter of119
2002, FSIS only inspected 61 million pounds and rejected a mere 713,000 pounds.  The inspection rate120
dropped to 6%. Under this inspection system meat that may have been previously rejected at the border,
may now make it onto supermarket shelves. In addition, zero eggs were rejected in the last quarter of
2002, as compared to 73,000 pounds of rejected eggs in the previous quarter.121
The new system is described in an FSIS news release as the system that has been in effect for
Canada.  The “streamlined” Canadian system, which was put in place in 1989 with the passage of the122
Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, has been criticized for not providing sufficient protection by the
owner of one of the 150 private import inspection establishments in which FSIS reinspection takes place.
Mike Tisdale, owner of U.S. Import Meat Inspection, in Sweetgrass, Montana, testified at a 2001 USDA
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hearing that: “...[T]he current Canadian system is in need of some change before being applied for the
rest of the world importing meat to the U.S. For example at my facility we received shipments totally [sic]
roughly 400 million pounds of meat last year, yet, our FSIS inspector was only instructed to examine
approximately 100,000 pounds or two hundredths of one percent. We feel this level of inspection is far too
low to provide a clear picture of a foreign country’s inspection program. Even with this low level of
inspection two and a half million pounds of Canadian meat was refused entry into the U.S. last year.”  123
Mr. Tisdale reports that during one week in January 2003, U.S. inspectors were instructed by the
automated computer system which designates lots for sampling only to take samples for testing from
seven of 248 tractor trailer loads from Canada that came through his import establishment.  124
FSIS MEAT AND POULTRY BORDER INSPECTIONS
 
Quarter Imported (Pounds) Inspected (Pounds) Rejected (Pounds)
Oct-Dec 2001 945,349,541 173,433,150 2,157,568
18% inspection rate
Jan-March 2002 923,756,633 166,930,958  2,701,236
18% inspection rate
April-June 2002 1,098,192,964 228,858,614 3,025,087
21% inspection rate
July-Sept 2002 1,053,344,944 191,767,489 2,141,695
18% inspection rate
Oct-Dec 2002 968,700,383 61,093,061 712,7442
6% inspection rate
Unless a shipment is selected for in-depth examination by the automated system, routine visual
inspection of a container holding 700-1000 cartons of imported meat can take as little as 15-20 minutes.  125
Routine visual inspection consists simply of an examination of transportation damage, general condition of
shipment, labeling compliance and proper certification.  For countries other than Canada, the product is
taken off the truck and “staged” so that the inspector can walk around each pallet.  Canadian meat is126
not  taken off the truck for inspection, but instead is given a given a cursory inspection at the back of the
truck.   In addition, carcasses examined at the back of the truck are pre-selected by Canadian127
inspectors who are motivated to put the place the best product in the back of the truck.
Once imported meat from Canada or any other country is allowed entry, it can be added to and
mixed with domestic or other foreign meat and meat products.  In the second quarter of 2002 alone,128
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1,098,192,964 pounds of meat were presented for import.  Approximately 79% was given no more than129
the visual form of reinspection. Yet, three million out of the more than 1 billion pounds presented were
refused entry.  “We could be inspecting more product at no additional cost to the government or the130
consumer. My employees and the FSIS inspector have already been paid and spend much time waiting
for the one in 20 shipments that are selected for inspection. We should be fully utilizing these already paid
for man-hours to inspect more meat,” says Tisdale.131
Crucial Missing Elements: Moreover, two components of the U.S. meat inspection process
underpin the integrity of the entire system; neither are required from foreign inspection systems which are
deemed “equivalent.”  First, in U.S. establishments, FSIS inspectors “have access at all times, by day or
night, ... to every part” of slaughtering and processing establishments.  By contrast, before FSIS sets132
foot in a foreign establishment, it has informed the exporting country “who will be visiting, what they wish
to see, where they wish to go, and when they wish to do so.”  Second, a U.S. inspector’s ability to carry133
out the duty to ensure that food is safe is backed up in the U.S. by a whistleblower law, which has
benefitted the American public greatly over the years as countless numbers of whistleblowers have
protected the public from unsafe meat, drugs, and other dangerous products, as well as government and
corporate fraud, waste and criminal behavior. However, foreign meat inspection systems are not required
to provide this protection.  134
C. FSIS’ PERFORMANCE IMPLEMENTING EQUIVALENCE
Since 1995, FSIS has implemented “equivalence” in ill-considered haste on a vast scale. The
results were predictable and devastating. The first report on the extent of the problems was produced by
the USDA’s own Office of the Inspector General in 2000. The unusually harsh report described a meat
and poultry inspection system in chaos. The report noted that:
C FSIS granted equivalency status to six countries for their HACCP program without conducting
onsite reviews;135
C Seven foreign establishments that had lost their eligibility to export to the U.S. were found to have
shipped 4,625,363 pounds of meat and poultry into the U.S.;136
C Nineteen plants that had not been re-certified as meeting U.S. standards were allowed to
continue to export meat to the U.S.;137
C Procedures for determining equivalency were not detailed enough to ensure that all aspects of a
country’s regulatory system were reviewed in accordance with applicable regulation and
equivalency determinations were based on insufficient documented analysis and support;  138
C Regulatory requirements that countries provide annual certifications of plants and residue test
plans were not enforced;  139
C FSIS had no clear procedures for determining if another country’s alternative testing methods
were equivalent;  140
C FSIS was underutilizing technical experts of the Technical Services Center and over utilizing
program analysts of the Equivalency and Planning Branch. In astonishingly severe language, the
Inspector General wrote “We question whether the Equivalence and Planning Branch,
collectively, has the technical expertise to make equivalency determinations;”  and141
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C Violations by certain countries were tolerated, while the same violations by other countries were
not tolerated. The fact that FSIS had no written procedures for terminating eligibility raised the
specter of arbitrary decisionmaking.142
The USDA Inspector General followed up with a 2003 report. Eighteen of the recommendations
in the June 2000 Inspector General’s Report concerned port-of-entry reinspection. Yet, amazingly, in a
report released in February 2003, the Inspector General found that FSIS had taken “adequate action” on
only four of these 18 recommendations.  Although the need for increased management oversight had143
been one of the major findings of the June 2000 report, the Inspector General found in 2003 that “inaction
occurred because no one was held accountable for implementing these recommendations and no
mechanism was established to alert top FSIS management officials that this work was not being done.”144
The report revealed that between January 1999 and March 2001, over seven million pounds of meat
which had entered the U.S. market came from 37 foreign establishments whose eligibility in the
computerized information system was contradicted by other documents.  Because of FSIS’ laxity and145
failure to take corrective action after the June 2000 report, the Inspector General concluded that it was
not possible for the agency to ensure that all meat entering the U.S. market was produced in plants that
were eligible to export to the U.S.
In a January 2003 interview with Public Citizen, one FSIS employee confirmed the confusion and
lack of good processes in the equivalency division of FSIS, by describing incomplete files, lengthy delays
in responding to a request for an equivalency determination, and pressure from supervisors to declare a
file complete even though many documents had not yet been translated into English.  146
In 2002, 43 countries had been granted equivalency status by FSIS for exports to the U.S. of
meat and meat products from cattle, sheep, swine and goats:  Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,147
Belize, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, England
and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Republic
of China, (Taiwan), Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia, Romania, Scotland, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.  Five have been granted equivalency status for poultry
exports: Canada, France, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Israel and Mexico.  Canada and Australia together148
account for approximately 70% of all meat and poultry imports.149
Starting in 2000, Public Citizen began filing requests under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).  for the documentation underlying meat inspection equivalency determinations for a number of150
countries. In response, FSIS produced audit reports for 12 countries, allowed Public Citizen to review
several files, but then claimed that other information was so widely dispersed that its production would be
burdensome and time-consuming and demanded that Public Citizen make advance payment of prohibitive
sums before providing further access.  More recent requests for the documentation underlying such
equivalency decisions still have not been responded to by FSIS. In 2001, FSIS began posting the most
recent audit reports and some of the ensuing correspondence on its website.   Although 43 countries are151
listed in the Code of Federal Regulations as eligible to export to the U.S., there are audits for only 33
countries on the website.
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Public Citizen’s review of the FSIS audits of five of countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Mexico, and Argentina, reveal a significant degree of confusion about the application of
“equivalence” in practice and an alarming gap between decisions made at the policy level and information
used for equivalency determinations acquired in the slaughterhouses and processing plants: 
C Systems with sanitary measures that differ from FSIS policy, and in some cases, actually violate
the express language of U.S. laws and regulations, have been declared “equivalent;”152
C Improper and/or unapproved testing procedures and sanitation violations have been re-identified
by FSIS year after year and are not remedied, but the countries have retained their eligibility
status to export to the U.S.;   153
C After their regulatory systems have been designated “equivalent,” countries have altered their
methods and procedures or adopted new ones that have never been evaluated by FSIS, which
FSIS has only discovered when later conducting an on-site audit;154
C Regulatory systems have been rated equivalent even though sufficient personnel and monetary
resources are not available to carry out all required functions;155
C Countries continue to use their own methods and procedures while awaiting a response from
FSIS to a request for an equivalency determination, but are treated as equivalent while they wait
for a response;  and,156
C FSIS auditors and foreign food safety officials disagree about whether or not particular measures
have already been found to be “equivalent” by FSIS. 
According to Sally Stratmoen, Acting Director of FSIS’ Equivalence Division, FSIS has tightened
its approach and now requires countries to demonstrate remedial enforcement efforts when deficiencies
are found.  However, the efficacy of this approach remains to be demonstrated, as evidenced by a157
November 2002 letter from Stratmoen to her Mexican counterparts pointing out that FSIS had received no
notification from Mexico about corrective actions following identification of deficiencies six months
earlier, although FSIS “expected the Mexican government to issue these letters and following 30 days
from issuance verify that the establishment made all necessary corrections.”  In order to determine the158
equivalence of foreign inspections systems’ enforcement powers and capacity, FSIS sent a questionnaire
to be completed by the exporting countries’ regulatory officials.  No country met FSIS’ initial FY 2002159
time line for submission of the information.   In fact, many countries had such difficulty responding to160
the detailed questionnaire that what was to have been a major initiative focusing on enforcement is more
than a year behind.     161
All the while, meat continues to come into the U.S. from these countries, stamped with a USDA
grade and placed on grocery shelves. Although a law authorizing a country-of-origin labeling system in the
U.S. was approved by Congress in 2001 and was slated to come into effect in 2004, industry is actively
seeking a repeal of this measure, apparently with the support of the USDA.  USDA has been dragging162
its heels with regard to issuing the required regulations, and in late June 2003, the House of
Representatives Appropriations Committee voted to eliminate funding for implementation of this program.
Thus, the fate of this program has yet to be decided. Without country-of-origin labeling, consumers have
no way to make informed purchasing decisions in light of concerns about international disease outbreaks
or food safety lapses. 
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Case 1:  Argentina - Is Twice a Year Equivalent to Daily?
In 2002, Argentina exported 85 million pounds of beef and veal to the U.S., even though some
exports were prohibited due to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in that nation.163
A review of Argentina’s audit reports over the years reveal a variety of problems. In June and
July of 1997, FSIS audited Argentina’s national laboratory and all of the 20 Argentinean establishments
that were then certified as eligible to export meat and meat products to the United States.  Thirteen of164
the establishments were rated as “acceptable” and seven were rated as provisionally acceptable but
requiring re-review. Yet, Argentina’s schedule for conducting the “re-reviews” is not specified in the
report. The auditor noted that: 
Incidents of cross-contamination were observed in twelve [sic] establishments, and
contamination with oil, hair, and feces in four while carcasses contacting the floor were
found in six plants. Plant system controls to assure sanitery [sic] plant operations and
effective preventive maintenance of plant facilities were not in place in the following
cases: in four location, [sic] condensate, flanking [sic] paint, contamination of product-
contact areas, and in three locations, maintenance and cleaning of product-contact
equipment was not adequate. Product-contact equipment was not maintained or
adequately cleaned in three establishments. Also, sanitizers were not maintained at 180F
in slaughter and processing operations, in four cases.165
There is no information in the 1997 audit report about Argentina’s demonstration of an effective
compliance and enforcement system. Yet, overall, Argentina’s meat inspection system was determined by
FSIS to have sufficiently effective controls in place to be eligible to export meat and meat products to the
United States.
Documents obtained by Public Citizen in response to the FOIA request raise serious questions
about FSIS’ equivalency determination concerning Argentina. The information provided to FSIS by
Argentina did not establish that Argentina was meeting U.S. requirements in the areas of mandatory
HACCP plans or continuous inspection and explicitly stated that monthly supervisory visits were not a
part of the Argentinean regulatory system. For example, the 1996 Procedures Manual of the Argentinean
regulatory agency describes its hazard management program as a “new volunteer program” based on
HACCP that is to “be voluntarily put in effect by the industries.”  The manual describes a multi-tiered166
system of regulatory inspection in which the frequency of inspection is determined by the number of
defects noted in the prior inspection. Establishments at the first tier of this system are to be inspected no
more frequently than every six months and second tier establishments, every three months.  Inspection167
plans are to include “[t]he place and date of where the inspection will be conducted.”  The U.S.168
regulations, by contrast, require the continuous presences of federal inspectors in slaughter plants at all
hours of operation and monthly supervisory visits to each establishment that produces meat for export to
the U.S.169
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The FOIA documents include minutes of meetings held within FSIS to review the information
submitted by Argentina in support of its request for a continuing equivalency determination. At a meeting
in 1998, FSIS officials noted that Argentina’s hazard management system was voluntary, that Argentina
intended to implement a less than continuous inspection system for establishments that implement hazard
management, and that Argentina had not provided any information on how it would implement Salmonella
standards and testing. The officials speculated among themselves that “[p]resumably an establishment
would have to have implemented HACCP in order to export to the U.S.”  The FSIS officials recorded170
that “clarification” was needed in three areas: continuous inspections, mandatory HACCP and an
explanation as to whether Argentina had an effective enforcement component.  A year later, FSIS171
officials reviewing the equivalency determination for Argentina were still recording that information and
noted that clarifications were needed as to the existence of an effective regulatory enforcement
component and that Argentina’s Salmonella testing program could not be reviewed until additional
information was provided.  172
Thus, years after having rated Argentina’s system to be “equivalent,” FSIS officials were still
unsure of Argentina’s adherence to key safety provisions of the U.S. regulatory system.
Argentina was audited again in March and April of 2001.  At that time, Argentina was eligible173
to export only cooked and canned meat due to an outbreak of foot and mouth disease.  Approximately174
one-fifth, or eight of the then 35, certified establishments were audited and all were found generally
acceptable. Argentina was found to be using both government and private laboratories to perform
Salmonella testing. Monthly supervisory reviews were being conducted at that time. However, Argentina
has since experienced a major economic crisis during which payment of government workers was
suspended for months at a time over the past two years, endangering Argentina’s ability to reach and
maintain the necessary level of direct regulatory involvement.
The most recent audit of Argentina available on the FSIS website was conducted in May and
June 2002.   The FSIS auditor visited 11, or 1/3, of the 34 then-certified establishments.  Of the 11, three175
were delisted during the audit because of problems that “impacted on food safety and public health” and a
fourth was delisted because of metal contamination that had been found at an import station.  An176
additional plant was delisted on the basis of a record review that showed no evidence of monthly
supervisory reviews for eight months.   HACCP implementation, an area of deficiency in the 2001177
audit, was again deficient in 90% of the plants visited.  The auditor concludes by stating that Argentina’s
inspection system “was found to have ineffective controls to ensure that product destined for export to the
United States was produced under conditions equivalent to those … FSIS requires …”   Nevertheless,178
Argentina retains its eligibility to export cooked and canned meat to the U.S.
FSIS rated Argentina “equivalent” despite the fact that Argentina’s official policy violated the
requirement of monthly supervisory reviews and despite Argentina’s failure to produce information
sufficient to enable FSIS to determine whether continuous inspection was being performed or whether an
effective enforcement system was in place. FSIS has continued to classify Argentina as “equivalent”
even though four out of 11 plants visited by the FSIS auditor in 2002 had to be removed from the eligibility
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list because they were not meeting U.S., or equivalent, standards.  What would the auditor have found if
he or she had visited the remaining 23 plants?
 Case 2:  Australia - Is One Inspector Equivalent to Four?
Australia and Canada are the top two exporters of red meat into the U.S. In 2002, Australia
exported 1.1 billion pound of beef and veal into the U.S.  In the mid-1990’s, Australia partially privatized179
its domestic meat inspection program and by the end of June 1997, 430 government meat inspectors had
been eliminated.  Between 1998 and 2000, government funding for meat inspection dropped from $20.3180
million to $6.4 million.181
In the late 1990s, Australia proposed to take its domestic, largely privatized meat inspection
system international and asked the U.S., the EU and other trading partners to approve its domestic system
for export. Its new export plan was called the Meat Safety Enhancement Program (MSEP). MSEP
tracked the domestic program by greatly reducing the role of federal inspectors and putting company
employees in charge of inspection duties. 
In 1999, European safety officials evaluated the MSEP program and rejected its use on meat for
export to Europe, concluding after an on-site assessment: “In many instances, the Australian quality
assurance systems permit establishment employees to act as if they were officers of the competent
authority. This is in breach of the requirement that inspectors should enjoy a status which guarantees their
impartiality. The level of official supervision and control is reduced to a level below that required by the
European legislation and must therefore be considered inadequate.”182
  However, MSEP received a warmer welcome in the U.S. After soliciting public comment on
the new Australian program, FSIS found MSEP to be equivalent to the U.S. system in June 1999.  The183
U.S. approved MSEP even though the program reduced the role of independent governmental inspection
to a single inspector at the end of the line to examine carcasses. This one inspector would stand in for an
average of four inspectors who traditionally work the length of the processing line, examining each
carcass and all other operations of the plant.184
Although the U.S. has approved MSEP as equivalent, no meat is currently being shipped to the
U.S.  Because MSEP was rejected by the EU, and because the plants that export to the EU are also the
plants that export to the U.S., Australia has refrained from switching over those plants to the MSEP
system.  The privatized Australian system is used for meat produced for Australian domestic185
consumption. After the programs implementation, public health officials noticed dramatic changes in
Australian Salmonella rates. Between 1993, when a pilot version was introduced, and 1999, reported
cases of Salmonella in Australia increased by over 60%, from 4,520 to 7,436, and the numbers continue
to climb.  In 2002, there were 7,747 reported cases of Salmonella. 186 187
  Australia refers to its domestic system as “co-regulation,”  but has been labeled “corporate188
self-inspection” by Tom Devine of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) who investigated its
effects in Australia in November 1999.  Through document reviews  and interviews with 15189 190
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whistleblowers and others, GAP documented a serious deterioration in the Australian food safety
system.  Though export facilities that have retained government inspectors were found to maintain191
higher standards than domestic plants, Australian export inspectors also identified numerous sanitation
violations, including pools of bloody fecal soup on floors that workers track onto productions lines and
dressing tables; pigeon and swallow fecal droppings on equipment, workers and food; and urine flying out
of carcasses, with no protection from cross contamination of equipment, food or workers showered by
sprays.192
FSIS audited the Australian meat inspection system in 2000, actually visiting only nine of the 99
establishments then-certified as eligible to export meat to the U.S., a rate of inspection of 10%.  The193
auditor approved Australia’s use of private laboratories for Salmonella testing as meeting FSIS
requirements. Of the nine establishments audited, eight were found to be acceptable; one was not. The
overall system continued to be rated as “equivalent.” The report documents the following problems that
were raised with Australian officials:
C Feces on product in three of the nine establishments and no effective procedure for detection and
removal of urine spillage on sheep carcasses in four of the nine;  194
C No post-mortem inspection of the heads of small stock; 195
C Different rate of sampling for generic E. coli testing for sheep;  and196
C Failure to incise lymph nodes of beef heads on routine post-mortem examinations.197
As to the first issue, Australian officials responded that they would “form a managerial group to
solve this problem [fecal and urine contamination] immediately.”  Regarding the other three problems,198
Australian officials responded that they had “submitted to International Policy Staff, FSIS, [for
equivalency determination] and they were awaiting a response.”199
In August and September 2001, FSIS returned to conduct another audit. At that time, there were
103 establishments certified to export meat to the United States.  FSIS visited 11 of the 103200
establishments, a rate of inspection of 10%, reviewed the records of another 18 and also visited three
ratite (ostrich and emu type birds) establishments newly proposed for certification. Twelve of the 14
plants that were audited were found to have effective system controls in place and two were
recommended for re-review because their HACCP programs were found not to meet FSIS regulatory
requirements. One establishment was suspended from eligibility to export to the U.S. (“delisted”) because
it had no HACCP program. The FSIS auditor noted that Australia had not adopted FSIS’ regulatory
requirements for E. coli testing in sheep.  201
Again, as in the previous year, the auditor raised problems regarding the U.S. zero tolerance for
feces, ingesta, milk and urine and again Australian officials responded that they “will form a managerial
group to solve this problem immediately.”202
Once again, the U.S. auditor raised the issues of incomplete post-mortem inspection of the heads
of small stock and different rate of sampling for generic E. coli testing for sheep. Again, as they had the
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previous year, Australian officials responded that the issues “had been submitted to International Policy
Staff, FSIS, and they were awaiting a response.”203
FSIS’ most recent reported audit of Australia was performed in February and March 2002.
Thirteen of the 101 then certified establishments were audited and all were found to have effective
system controls in place.  FSIS found improvement in the area of urine spillage, but noted failures to204
prevent cross-contamination in seven of the 13 audited plants.  In a review of Australia’s enforcement205
activities, the report states that 31 meat-related incidents resulted in discussions with management,
including security breaches, obstruction of authorized officers, entry of ineligible product into the export
chain, and incorrect trade descriptions and regulations relating to official marks.  As before in 2000 and206
2001, the auditor noted that Australia had not adopted FSIS’ regulatory requirements for E. coli testing in
sheep and has requested an equivalency determination on this issue. As before in 2000, the auditor pointed
out that lymph glands of beef heads are not being incised in post-mortem examinations.  In October207
2002, FSIS requested that their Australian counterparts “immediately commence with the incision and
examination of the ... lymph nodes of the heads of all cattle slaughtered from which meat is obtained for
export to the U.S.” pending FSIS’ review of Australia’s equivalence proposal on this issue.208
The likelihood that a U.S. consumer will encounter Australian beef increased in April 2002, when
the McDonald’s chain announced that it was going to start using imported Australian beef in U.S.
restaurants.209
FSIS rated Australia “equivalent” despite the fact that its privatized inspection system violates the
fundamental U.S. requirement of impartial government inspectors; despite the fact that it repeatedly failed
to remedy violations of U.S. sanitation standards; despite the fact that it uses a method of testing for E.
coli that has not been found to be equivalent by FSIS; and despite the fact that it has not required plants
to perform post-mortem inspections as mandated by U.S. law.
Case 3:  Brazil - Company-Paid Meat Inspectors Equal to Government Inspectors?
Brazil is eligible to export only cooked beef products to the U.S. due to the presence of hog
cholera, swine vesicular disease and foot-and-mouth disease.  In 2002, Brazil exported 201 million210
pounds of cooked meat to the U.S.211
In January 1998, 26 Brazilian establishments were certified to export meat to the U.S. When
FSIS announced that an audit was to take place, Brazil removed six of them from eligibility, stating that
the plants voluntarily withdrew “for economic reasons.”  FSIS audited 16 of the remaining212
establishments and found that one or more inspection employees were company-paid in 15 of the 16, for a
total of 55 inspection employees who were compensated directly by the establishments they inspected.  213
Brazilian officials explained that funding problems had led to the use of company-paid inspectors, but that
emergency funding was being sought through a Presidential Decree.   They further stated that company214
employees would stop inspecting meat to be exported to the U.S.  All 16 establishments audited by FSIS215
were rated acceptable, but the auditors recommended an on-site follow-up audit “to verify compliance of
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[sic] U.S. requirements” before the end of 1998.  The report does not refer to any enforcement216
activities.
The next audit of the Brazilian meat inspection system was not conducted until March and April
1999.   At that time, 21 establishments were certified to export meat to the U.S. FSIS audited 14, two-217
thirds of the total, and found that in two there were “neither inspection system controls nor establishment
system controls... in place to prevent, detect, control and correct contamination and adulteration of meat
products.”  Yet of the 14 establishments audited by FSIS, nine were rated acceptable; five were rated218
“acceptable/re-review.”  The report does not mention any enforcement activities, nor does it make
mention of company-paid inspectors.
When FSIS audited Brazil in 2000, nine, or 36%, of the 25 then-certified establishments were
visited.  Of the nine, one was rated unacceptable. Significant problems were found at the one laboratory219
audited, including lack of chemicals required for pesticide testing.  At the exit meeting, Brazilian officials
stated that funds for chemicals at the laboratory would be “available immediately.” Enforcement activities
are mentioned only as a subject discussed with Brazilian officials.  220
In July and August 2001, FSIS audited nine of the 28 then-certified establishments and found that
“[i]n-depth knowledge of HACCP is lacking in most” of them.  Examples of the cross-contamination221
that was found to be occurring include: 
C In two establishments, over-spray above the carcass wash was falling from the contaminated rail
onto a clean rail of carcasses;
C The moving viscera (internal organs) table was coming up with residues from the previous use in
three establishments;
C The employee, who was cutting across the anus, continued the cut into other tissues without
sanitizing the knife in two establishments, spreading fecal contamination; and,
C The buccal cavity was opened before the mouth cavity was washed resulting in possible
contamination of exposed product with ingesta in [one] establishment.222
An import station in the U.S. has found Salmonella in samples of cooked frozen meat from a
Brazilian plant “on more than one occasion.”  Investigation of the plant revealed that hydraulic oil that223
was contaminated with Salmonella was dripping from a product press onto exposed meat. Monthly
supervisory reviews were not being conducted in any establishments and the auditor noted that the
requirement was “made clear” during the audit.  Although the auditor reports that Brazil found 155224
violations and issued 62 warnings and 79 penalties, he also notes that he did not receive the documentation
of enforcement activities that he had requested.225
The most recent reported audit of Brazil’s regulatory system was conducted in January and
February 2002. Thirteen plants, 45%, of the 29 then-certified establishments, were audited. Seven were
selected “because of their implication in misbranding of canned corned beef.”  Of the 13 plants, two226
were delisted by Brazilian officials after the auditor found serious sanitation problems. The auditor notes
that serious problems were found in the remaining 11 establishments as well, but they were “allowed to
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continue to operate and within 30 days be verified for full compliance by” the Brazilian regulatory
authority.  227
Deficiencies that were identified in the prior audit that had not been corrected included failure to
perform pre-shipment reviews in all plants, HACCP plans with critical limits that were not measurable,
actual and potential product contamination, failure to perform monthly supervisory reviews in all plants,
and deficiencies in quality assurance in the private laboratories that performed microbiological testing.228
Additional deficiencies identified during the audit included inadequate hazard analysis in 10 of the 13
plants’ HACCP plans,  inadequate pest control prevention in 12 of the 13, and, in 10 of the 13,229
reconditioning of dropped product performed by the inspectors instead of by establishment personnel.230
Under “Enforcement Activities” in the audit report, it was noted that in six establishments “inspection
devices (brands) were not adequately kept under inspectional control.”  Brazil uses plant employees to231
take Salmonella samples and private laboratories to test those samples.   These measures are rated232
equivalent even though they contradict U.S. regulatory policy.
In an April 10, 2002 response to the 2001 audit report, the Brazilian regulatory agency stated that
Brazil would be submitting a request to have its quarterly inspection system declared equivalent to the
U.S. requirement of monthly supervisory reviews.   233
FSIS rated Brazil “equivalent” despite the fact that its use of company-paid inspectors violated
the fundamental U.S. requirement of impartial government inspectors; despite the fact that it failed to
carry out required testing in a timely fashion due to continued funding problems; despite fecal
contamination and serious sanitation problems; despite its failure to demonstrate an effective enforcement
system; despite its repeated failure to ensure that plants developed adequate hazard control plans; despite
its use of company employees and private labs for Salmonella testing; and despite its repeated failure to
conduct the monthly supervisory reviews required by U.S. law. 
Case 4:  Canada - Myth vs. Reality
In 2002, Canada exported 1.1 billion pound of beef and veal to the U.S.  Under “streamlined”234
inspection procedures put into place under the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreements, Canadian
products have been treated differently than all similar products entering the U.S. and Canadian officials
are authorized to conduct certain of the required testing procedures.  For example, depending on the235
level of inspection assigned by FSIS’ computerized sampling system, a Canadian shipment may be given
only a cursory check at the rear of the vehicle by the U.S. import inspector.  In contrast, shipments236
from other countries are off-loaded and subjected to a complete visual inspection for transportation
damage, labeling, proper certification, general condition and accurate count. When a sample from a
shipment of ground beef from a country other than Canada tests positive for E. coli 0157:H7, the U.S.
import inspector will collect samples from the next 15 consecutive shipments from the same
establishment. However, if the shipment is from Canada, the establishment may request that Canadian
food inspectors perform the sampling and certify the results.  237
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Canada’s inspection system operates differently from the U.S. system in a number of areas.  Yet,
two departures from U.S. regulatory requirements in the area of Salmonella testing have been classified
as “equivalent” by FSIS: (1) The establishment takes the samples instead of government employees,238
and (2) private laboratories are used instead of government laboratories.  However, no equivalency239
determinations have been made as to other features of the current Canadian system, including failure to
conduct the monthly supervisory reviews that are mandated by the U.S. regulations,  use of a different240
sampling system for generic E. coli,  and use of a different analytical method to test for E. coli241
0157:H7.  In a letter dated October 15, 2002, U.S. officials promise to “expedite review” of Canada’s242
request for equivalency determinations.  In the meantime, Canada continues to operate by its different243
rules, and until the very recent discovery of a case of mad cow disease in Canada, Canadian meat
continued to enter the U.S. under the streamlined border inspection system.
Differences of opinion in the area of microbial testing are far from academic matters. FSIS has
been conducting a sampling program since E. coli 0157:H7 was classified as an adulterant in ground beef
in 1994.  In February 2000, USDA’s Agricultural Research Service found that the prevalence of the244
potentially lethal pathogen was higher than previously reported, reaching levels of 28% in animals
presented for slaughter and 43% of carcasses.  In September 2002, FSIS declared “war on E. coli” and245
began requiring all establishments that produce raw beef products to reassess their HACCP plans based
on recent evidence that E. coli 0157:H7 “is a hazard reasonably likely to occur at all stages of handling
raw beef products.”  246
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), on the other hand, considered it necessary in
September 2000 to publish a fact sheet entitled “E. coli 0157:H7 Myths v. Reality,” defending itself
against “[r]ecent articles [that] have suggested Canada’s inspection system is not tough enough on E. coli
in ground beef.”   The fact sheet contains the following passage:247
MYTH: It is possible to effectively test meat for the presence of E. coli 0157:H7.
FACT: Health Canada does not recommend routine sample testing as a public health
measure because the rate of occurrence of E. coli 0157:H7 in ground beef products is
very low. 
The deadly effects of E. coli 0157:H7 were demonstrated in Canada in May 2000, when seven
people died in Walkerton, Ontario, after manure run-off from a farm contaminated the town’s drinking
water.   In July 2001, the Calgary Sun reported that local cases of E. coli had doubled in the past two248
years and that CFIA had increased its monitoring of meat producers in Alberta following a recall of
ground beef from Lakeside Packers for possible E. coli 0157:H7 contamination.  During this same time249
period, FSIS twice announced voluntary recalls of ground beef products produced by Lakeside Packers
and distributed in the U.S. In June 2000, 46,000 pounds were recalled after the problem was discovered
by laboratory tests performed by a customer and in April 2001, 204,000 pounds were recalled after a250
sample of ground beef was tested by CFIA.   It is worth noting that when USDA discovered E. coli251
0157:H7 in a shipment of ground beef from Lakeside Packers in 1997, Canadian officials reportedly called
it an “isolated incident” and warned against overreacting.  252
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The most recent FSIS audit of Canada’s meat inspection system, for which a report is available
on the FSIS website, was conducted in June and July 2001.  At that time, 513 establishments were253
certified to export meat and poultry to the U.S.  Of these, nine were audited, an inspection rate of less254
than 2%. Six of the nine were rated as acceptable and three were recommended for re-review. Several
problems that had been identified in the prior audit had not been remedied, among them deficiencies in
dressing and sanitizing procedures, which “still need more improvement”  and reduced supervisory255
reviews, which were occurring only quarterly in Alberta and only one to three times per year in
Quebec.  The auditor reported that “[t]he method for testing for E. coli 0157:H7 used by FSIS has not256
been approved by Health Canada, so it has not been used by CFIA.”  Zero tolerance for fecal257
contamination was not adhered to in all establishments and pre-shipment reviews were performed in only
two, with the remaining establishments stating that they were not aware of the requirement.   Improper258
testing and evaluation of generic E. coli was found at two establishments, one of which was Lakeside
Packers.  259
When the auditor discussed U.S. requirements with Canadian officials, the officials responded by
saying that they would confer with International Policy Staff regarding clarification of the equivalence of
the sampling procedures. Despite the outright differences between Canadian and U.S. sanitary measures,
and the unresolved issues awaiting equivalency determination, the U.S. auditor concluded that Canadian
meat products were produced under conditions equivalent to those which FSIS requires in domestic
establishments. 
In a May 2002 letter responding to the 2001 audit, Canada contended that its failure to perform
pre-shipment reviews is a feature of its hazard management plan, which was previously found by FSIS to
be “equivalent” to the U.S. HACCP rule, and is therefore permissible under the concept of
equivalence.  The director of Canada’s food inspection agency describes the U.S. auditor’s concern260
about monthly supervisory reviews – a mandatory provision of U.S. law – to be “an unfortunate
misunderstanding.”  Citing FSIS’ knowledge that Canada has conducted quarterly, instead of monthly261
reviews “for years,” the director of the exporting country’s regulatory system takes over the role of the
importing country and declares: “... [W]e considered this activity as ‘Equivalent’.”  262
FSIS rated Canada “equivalent” despite its use of microbial sampling and analytical procedures
that differ from FSIS requirements and have never been determined to be equivalent by FSIS; despite its
use of company employees and private labs for Salmonella testing; despite plants not adhering to a zero
tolerance policy for fecal contamination; and despite its repeated failure to conduct the monthly
supervisory reviews that are required by U.S. law.
Case 5:  Mexico - Equivalent, Except as Otherwise Noted 
Mexico is currently eligible to export raw and cooked beef products to the U.S.   In 2002,263
Mexico exported 16 million pounds of beef to the U.S.  In the spring of 1999, FSIS conducted an audit264
of Mexico’s meat inspection system and concluded that there were “serious concerns regarding the
equivalence of the Mexican inspection system to the U.S. inspection system.”   At that time, there were265
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37 establishments certified as eligible to export meat to the U.S. The auditors found that company-paid
inspectors conducted and/or controlled inspection in 17 of the 37 certified establishments, an inspection
rate of 27%.  Ten establishments were audited; two were found to be acceptable; three were rated266
marginally acceptable and had their eligibility to export suspended pending corrective action; five were
found to be unacceptable and were decertified.  There is no reference to enforcement activities in the267
report.
In addition to the lack of government inspectors, the following major deficiencies were identified
in the 1999 audit report:
C Required monthly supervisory inspections were not being conducted;268
C There were serious sanitation deficiencies, such as ingesta, fecal and hair contamination ( many
deficiencies having been previously noted by the establishment or inspectors and not
corrected);269
C In four of five slaughter and ground beef operations reviewed, E. coli sampling was not
conducted randomly; 
C Salmonella testing was not similar to FSIS and did not meet U.S. requirements; 270
C Government inspectors said they had no training in pathogen reduction implementation;  271
C There appeared to be no national monitoring program for Listeria;  272
C Laboratory results were not provided on a timely basis unless fees were paid by the
establishments;273
C One establishment was using labels approved by FSIS for a sister establishment in California;274
C Required residue testing was not being done due to lack of resources;  and275
C Continuous inspection was not being provided in plants that operated two shifts due to staffing
shortages.   276
Finding that “[t]he information ... suggests that conditions of serious public health concern exist in
Mexico,”  the auditors recommended that FSIS conduct a team “systems audit” of all establishments277
certified to export to the U.S. However, no review of all establishments was ever conducted and one of
the plants that lost its certification during the audit, after a diseased carcass was found ready for boning,
had its export license restored under a new name by Mexican officials.278
 
In November 1999, FSIS visited 20 plants of the 37 then-certified establishments. Of these, 12
were found to be acceptable; five were rated marginally acceptable; and three were found to be
unacceptable.279
In November and December 2000, FSIS again audited Mexico’s meat inspection system.  280
Eleven, barely one-third, of the 34 then-certified establishments were audited and seven laboratories were
visited. Seven of the establishments were found to be acceptable; three were acceptable but
recommended for re-review; one was unacceptable. One establishment was still using a company-paid
inspector, although the auditor noted that Mexico had been told during two prior audits that the
requirement of government inspectors was “non-negotiable”.  281
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In the December 2000 report, the auditor documented that there was inadequate government
oversight to ensure compliance with the Salmonella testing procedures and that laboratories were not
using a procedure that would detect E. coli 0157:H7 in ground beef samples or performing reliably
compliant sampling for generic E. coli.   Most laboratories that were performing generic E. coli testing282
were doing it incorrectly and “alternate testing methods” were being used for Salmonella and E. coli283
0157:H7 that had not been submitted to FSIS for equivalence determination.  Six weeks or more could284
elapse before an establishment was delisted by Mexico after being found not to meet U.S.
requirements.  When the Mexican supervisor who was performing the inspections during the audit tried285
to delist an establishment based on findings made on-site, her decision was countermanded by her
superiors.286
 Nonetheless, the auditor concluded that “except as otherwise noted,”  the inspection system of287
Mexico had effective controls in 10 of the 11 establishments audited to ensure that product destined for
export to the U.S. was produced under conditions equivalent to those that FSIS requires in domestic
establishments.
When FSIS performed another audit in November 2001, three of the 29 then-certified
establishments were still found to have company-paid employees conducting inspections. These three
plants were delisted. Eleven of the 29 certified establishments were audited and four of the seven
approved private labs were visited. Effective controls were found to be in place for all of the
establishments, but two were recommended for re-review.  Materials needed for Salmonella and288
Listeria testing were not readily available in some laboratories.  Some samples were not reaching the289
laboratory in a timely manner.  Two laboratories were using a sample size much smaller than FSIS290
requires and certain aspects of the testing methodology still needed to be submitted to the U.S. for
equivalency determination.  291
Yet again, the auditor concluded that “except as noted”  Mexico’s inspection system had292
effective controls to ensure that product destined for export to the U.S. was produced under conditions
equivalent to those which FSIS requires in domestic establishments. Following the 2001 audit, USDA
reportedly ordered reinspection of all Mexican meat at the U.S. border for several months.293
In the most recent reported audit of Mexico’s meat regulatory system, performed in April and
May 2002, 12 of the 30 then-certified establishments were audited, an inspection rate of 40%.  The294
auditor noted in the section on enforcement activities that there had been no investigations or prosecutions
in the previous year.   Of the four major concerns identified in the prior audit, two had been resolved295
and two had improved. “Thirty-day letters” requiring corrective actions were issued to three of the 12
establishments for deficiencies, such as incomplete HACCP plans, lack of an E. coli testing plan, and
inadequate clean-up of splitting saws.  Six months after the audit was conducted, FSIS was still awaiting296
confirmation from Mexico that corrective actions had been taken in response to the “thirty-day letters.”  297
Although government inspectors collect Salmonella samples, the laboratory testing is done in both at
government and private labs.298
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FSIS rated Mexico “equivalent” despite the fact that its repeated use of company-paid inspectors
violates the fundamental U.S. requirement of impartial government inspectors; despite its failure to adhere
to the core U.S. requirement of continuous inspection; despite its failure to perform microbial testing
adequately, or at all; despite its use of non-government labs for Salmonella testing; despite problems with
fecal contamination; despite its failure to comply with the requirement of monthly supervisory reviews;
despite its failure to demonstrate an effective enforcement system; despite its failure to correct
contamination problems; and despite its use of testing methodologies that have never been found to be
equivalent by FSIS.
Reviewing just these five of the 43 countries whose regulatory systems have been declared
equivalent to that of the United States, U.S. officials documented significant violations of all of the core
protections of the U.S. meat safety laws. Sanitary standards have not been met; required testing has not
been performed or has been performed improperly; continuous inspection and required supervisory
oversight have not been provided; and the key safeguard of direct inspection by impartial publicly-paid
inspectors has been disregarded. And yet, FSIS continues to rate these country’s meat inspection
standards as “equivalent” and U.S. consumers continue, unknowingly, to purchase and eat meat that has
not been produced in compliance with their democratically enacted laws.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Even without exposing the public to such flagrant violations of U.S. food safety policy through
equivalence, the domestic food safety system has plenty of problems. Massive recalls like the 2002
Conagra recall of millions of pounds of contaminated ground beef, which caused one death and
sickened 47 people in 23 states, continue to occur and continue to be mishandled by USDA officials
who are reluctant to crack down on huge slaughter and processing operations.  Public Citizen has299
reported extensively on problems related to the HACCP system in the U.S. and the problems with
implementing U.S. microbial testing standards, (See, Public Citizen and Government Accountability
Project reports, Jungle 2000: Is America’s Meat Safe to Eat? and Hamburger Hell: The Flip Side
of USDA Salmonella Testing Program). In addition, Public Citizen has extensively studied the
machinations of the food irradiation industry, which is selling this untested and unsafe technology to the
American public as a silver bullet for microbial contamination and is in the process of expanding
operations overseas in order to irradiate more and more produce headed for U.S. markets.
Consumers and health and safety advocates need to monitor food safety issues here at home
and continue to press the U.S. government for higher standards and for better enforcement.  However,
given the increasing volume of meat imports, U.S. consumers also need to be vigilant about imported
meat. The staff of 75 U.S. border inspectors is a thin blue line charged with ensuring the safety,
wholesomeness and proper packaging and labeling of the 4 billion pounds of meat and poultry products
entering the U.S.
The concepts of equivalence and harmonization were born in the context of the European
Common Market, which is now a borderless grouping of countries where goods and products are
granted unfettered entry across national boundaries. Notably, these issues still remain controversial in
Europe and generate frequent lawsuits between nations. This is true even though the Common Market
countries also provided a significant amount of financial and technical assistance to nations which
needed to elevate their standards to achieve a comparable level of protection to other EU nations. This
is particularly striking considering the relatively small gaps between the European countries compared to
the differences between U.S. standards and those of many of the nations from which it imports meat.
Given the vast discrepancy in resources and infrastructure between the 145 member nations of
the WTO and the discrepancies even within the three NAFTA nations, it is becoming abundantly clear
that the concept of equivalence is not easy to translate to other multi-lateral groupings. The U.S. food
safety budget is close to a billion dollars.  By contrast, in 1992, Mexico’s spending on food safety300
inspection was $25 million. Three years later, with food exports soaring under NAFTA, but with
Mexico reeling from the peso crash and obligated by new loan agreements to implement further
“structural adjustment,” Mexico’s food inspection funding was slashed to $5 million.  By 2001,301
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Mexico’s total food safety and animal and plant health budget had returned to the $25 million level –
half a percent of Mexico’s agriculture ministry budget and less than one dollar per Mexican citizen.302
Yet, over the past nine years since NAFTA went into effect, Mexican fresh meat exports to the U.S.
have risen 300%.  303
Developing countries are demanding, and they deserve, significant levels of technical support
and financial assistance to lift their food safety standards, first to protect their own citizens from
foodborne illnesses and second, to facilitate trade. Such assistance is one of developing nations’
primary demands in the WTO negotiations. Many countries, with few funds to implement food safety
programs, have difficulty in even achieving minimal standards promulgated by international standard-
setting organizations, like the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and thus view equivalency as a possible
way out of this conundrum.
Developed nations are not delivering the aid needed to help these countries adopt, implement
and enforce either Codex standards or importing country standards. According to a survey of Codex
member countries used in a recently released Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health
Organization evaluation of Codex, legislators in many developing countries are reluctant to adopt
standards since there is no money to enforce and implement them domestically.  The evaluation report304
revealed a “stark contrast” between the technical assistance and capacity building requested by
developing countries to equip governments to implement standards and the modest educational trainings
on food safety offered by developed nations and international agencies.  Discussions on how to assist305
developing countries with their “SPS” problems are taking place in the WTO, the Codex, the World
Bank and other international institutions. However, for the most part, these discussions focus on raising
funds to help officials from developing nations participate in the meetings of the institutions themselves,
not on a coordinated effort to raise global food safety by investing in domestic food safety operations.
This report documents that the increasing level of imports due to WTO-required equivalency
determinations, combined with different foreign standards, the inadequate auditing of foreign plants and
minimalist border checks has resulted in a broad abrogation of U.S. food safety standards.
Compounded with a shrinking level of international aid for capacity building and vast discrepancies in
the food safety infrastructure of nations, this is a recipe for disaster. Just at a time when all governments
must be more vigilant about increased risk of food contamination due to higher levels of trade, and even
the possibility of terrorist biocontamination, regulation and government action is constrained by legally-
binding trade promotion rules that elevate the fast and unfettered importation of products over all other
concerns. 
To address these problems and concerns, Public Citizen makes the following recommendations:
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EQUIVALENCY IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR COMPLIANCE: Congress must intervene to change
the underlying law and regulations so that USDA once again establishes that trading partners maintain the
same standards as the U.S. to be eligible to export food products into the U.S. The only deviation from
U.S. standards that should be allowed are more stringent standards geared toward preventing specific
food safety hazards posed by unique geographical conditions. FDA must be given similar authority to
approve countries’ laws, regulatory systems, standards and enforcement policies as compliant with U.S.
standards for food production purposes and ban product from nations that are not compliant.
ADEQUATE STAFF AND PERSONNEL FOR OVERSEAS AUDITS: Both USDA and FDA must
be given more money for conducting rigorous overseas audits and the follow up that is necessary to
instruct foreign regulators on U.S. food safety policies and procedures. FSIS’s six auditors appear to be a
woefully inadequate number of staff to annually confirm the equivalency status of 43 nations for fresh
meat and five for poultry. It is hard to believe they will have the resources to perform rigorous audits of
the more than 25-plus additional nations demanding equivalency.  Some audit teams visit only a small306
fraction of the plants eligible to export. U.S. audit teams should not only examine the laws, regulatory
structure and enforcement record and capacity of each nation, but they should resume the practice of
inspecting and certifying every foreign plant shipping product to the U.S. on an annual basis. FDA should
also be granted funds to implement certification of each plant eligible to export to the U.S. Currently FDA
is only able to inspect a small portion of plants that export food to the U.S. 
SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE BORDER INSPECTION ACTIVITIES: After the September 11,
2001 attacks, FDA received funds to put 300 new consumer safety officers at U.S. ports of entry.307
However, it is projected that in 2003 FDA will only be able to increase its inspection rate from .6% to
1.3% of imports.  In addition to other funds, USDA received funds for 20 new mobile “Import308
Surveillance Liaison Inspection Officers” to enhance border inspection operations.  Until very recently, 309
USDA’s 75 border inspectors attempted to inspect an estimated 18% of meat imports and randomly
sample a small subset of this percentage for microbial contamination, illegal drug residues and species
verification.  This situation was already a cause for concern prior to the recent changes in the310
computerized Automated Import Information System, but the changes to the AIIS border inspection
system which kicked in during the last quarter of 2002 bring new cause for alarm. As previously noted,
the changes resulted in a 65% drop in the rate of meat imports inspected, from 18% to 6%. In addition to
securing more funds to substantially increase border inspection activities, immediate Congressional
scrutiny is needed to examine this new system and the cause and effect of this tremendous drop-off in
border inspection.
DEVELOP CLEAR POLICIES FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AGENCY INTERNATIONAL
ACTIVITIES: The implementation of WTO-mandated harmonization and equivalency mechanisms
fundamentally undermines domestic, democratic decisionmaking regarding food safety policy. Consumers
have little idea that important regulatory decisions involving the safety of the food on their plates are being
made in imprecise, bilateral equivalency negotiations or unaccountable multilateral trading institutions like
the Codex and the WTO. All federal agencies engaged in international activities, must develop clear and
consistent rules for public engagement in these activities to give U.S. consumers a voice through a
participatory public process during multi-year negotiations and certainly before agreements are finalized.
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A model administrative procedure for equivalency and harmonization activities is attached to this briefing
memo as Appendix C. It is entirely unacceptable that the U.S.-EU Veterinary Equivalency Agreement
was negotiated for six years without public notice. Similarly it is inappropriate for FSIS to recertify year
after year that certain trading partners are “equivalent” without giving the public an opportunity to review
FSIS data, evidence of problems and other information. Closed-door decisionmaking has no place in
federal agencies charged with consumer protection.
TRADE SHOULD NO LONGER TRUMP PUBLIC HEALTH: There is a growing international call
for a paring back of the key WTO agreements like the WTO TBT and WTO SPS agreements that
inappropriately delve into regulatory issues via such trade promotion mechanisms as harmonization and
equivalency. Not only do the provisions in these agreements make it easier for nations to attack each
other’s public health, consumer protection, and food safety regulations at barriers to trade, but they
inappropriately elevate trade promotion over all other public policy concerns, including that of ensuring a
safe and wholesome food supply. If the same domestic regulatory standard is applied to both domestic
and imported food, the level of protection or enforcement is something those living with the results must
decide. There is no trade issue if there is no discrimination.
FUNDS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING: The U.N. projects that by 2030, two thirds of the meat
produced in the world will come from developing nations.  In addition to ensuring compliance and311
verification, developed nations must live up to their responsibility to assist developing nations with the
financial and technical assistance needed to secure the safety of their own domestic food supply as well
as exports. This assistance must go well beyond educational trainings and demonstrate a substantial
commitment to ensuring global food safety as a public health priority. The woeful inadequacy of current
efforts poses needless health threats for consumers around the world.
COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY USDA: The 2002 Farm
Bill included a country-of-origin (COOL) labeling provision for beef, lamb, pork, farm-raised fish, fruits
and vegetables that is slated to be implemented by 2004. The Bush administration objected to the country-
of-origin labeling requirements, but ultimately accepted them in the context of the overall legislative
package it felt compelled to support. Since passage, the COOL requirements have been under attack by
industry and U.S. trading partners alike.  Canada, Australia and New Zealand have all complained that312
COOL violates NAFTA and WTO rules.  Recently, USDA Secretary Ann Veneman has made313
statements suggesting that the law could be repealed by Congress.  On June 25, 2003, the House314
Appropriations Committee approved the 2004 Agriculture and FDA Appropriations Bill which defunds the
COOL program. Rather than back-tracking on the COOL program, Congress and the USDA should
promptly implement rules for COOL which are overwhelmingly supported by consumers who want more
information about the food on their plates, not less.   The complexity of applying COOL to ground beef,315
which can contain meat from a multitude of nations, should prompt USDA to develop new rules for
processors placing limits on co-mingling of meat, in order to facilitate rapid trace-back systems if
contamination is discovered.
EXAMINATION OF AGRICULTURAL CONCENTRATION: In recent years, a small number of
large firms have come to dominate the meat and grain industry in the U.S. through a complex cluster of
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alliances, joint ventures, partnerships and mergers. The U.S. government has encouraged this
consolidation by failing to enforce the 1921 Packers and Stockyards Act, a strong anti-trust policy for the
livestock and meat industry.  Much of the meat produced in the developing world now and in the future316
will be produced by these companies, which are increasingly moving off-shore to take advantage of lower
wages, low production costs and tax rates, as well as poor environmental and food safety standards.
Congress should investigate the effects of this concentration on independent meat and grain producers,
food workers, consumers and the environment. Congress should also instruct the General Accounting
Office to investigate the extent to which U.S. agencies such as the USDA and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative are using tax dollars to encourage or subsidize the relocation of this industry
overseas. Rigorous enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act by the USDA and the U.S.
Department of Justice is a first step to addressing this issue in the U.S. and the potential for international
anti-trust policies should also be explored under the auspices of the United Nations. 
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APPENDIX A: 
CODEX PRODUCES WTO-APPROVED EQUIVALENCY RULES 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) in Rome is poised to approve international
guidelines to promote trade in food products to facilitate the equivalency mandate of the World Trade
Organization’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. The Codex was established as an
international food standard-setting body in 1962 by the World Health Organization and the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization. The WTO SPS Agreement sets criteria that WTO nations must follow
regarding policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life and designates Codex standards as the
world’s presumptively trade-legal standards and the point of reference in any WTO dispute regarding
food safety measures.
Codex Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with
Food Inspection and Certification Systems, are slated for final approval and adoption at the June 30-
July 7, 2003 Codex Alimentarius Commission meeting.  If passed as anticipated by the Codex General317
Assembly, these Guidelines could serve to undermine differing domestic policies on equivalency around
the world.
Once in place, Codex equivalency Guidelines are sure to generate more problems than they
solve.  Nations denied food equivalency decisions will use the Codex Guidelines as ammunition in their
WTO disputes, and a nation’s process for determining equivalency could itself become a WTO
adjudicable issue over and above whatever other sanitary measures may be causing trade friction.
The Harmonization Rules of NAFTA and the WTO: In addition to equivalency, there is
another NAFTA and WTO-required trade facilitation mechanism that significantly affects domestic
regulatory standards. NAFTA and the WTO both oblige member governments to base their domestic
standard-setting on specified international standards and on international standard-setting techniques. For
example, the WTO SPS Agreement requires that countries “base their sanitary and phytosanitary
measures [food standards] on international standards, guidelines or recommendations.”  This process is318
called “harmonization” by its proponents, and is especially relevant to this briefing paper because of a
current proposal to create international standards for determining food equivalency. This effort has been
sanctioned by the WTO and is aimed at encouraging nations to develop the exact same procedure for
determining equivalency and discouraging the diversity of procedures that a democratic, participatory
process in different countries might create.
The potential problems related to the establishment of such internationally harmonized rules in the
food safety area or any other area of public health or environmental protection are multi-fold.
Theoretically, international harmonization could occur at the lowest or highest levels of public health or
environmental protection or somewhere in between. Unfortunately, the actual provisions in NAFTA and
the WTO requiring harmonization, or providing incentives for harmonization, are likely to result in the
lowering of the best existing domestic public health, social, economic justice, natural resource
conservation and environmental standards around the world. 
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This is the case because, under NAFTA and the WTO, international standards serve as a ceiling
which countries cannot exceed rather than as a floor that all countries must meet. The agreements
provide for the challenge of any domestic standards that go beyond international standards in providing
greater citizen safeguards, but contain no provisions for challenging standards that fall below the named
international standard. Thus, the provisions in NAFTA and the WTO promoting harmonization are likely to
serve only as a one-way downward ratchet on domestic standards. Challenges of domestic standards that
exceed international standards are resolved in the binding dispute resolution system built into these
agreements, which is closed to public participation or observation. This is the “race to the bottom” that is
built into WTO and NAFTA rules.
U.S. agency officials are currently engaged in innumerable harmonization negotiations around the
world in an ever-increasing number of venues, some governmental and some private. NAFTA and the
WTO name specific international standards, such as those established by the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) in Geneva and the Codex in Rome as presumptively complying with trade rules.
Both the ISO and Codex are dominated by industry. Citizen input into these organizations is essentially
non-existent and significant participation by health or consumer groups is extremely limited. For instance,
one individual at Consumers International currently attempts to cover five of the ISO’s 2850 working
groups, and only three U.S. consumer groups lobby within the Codex, which has 24 committees meeting
all over the world on a regular basis. The result of the WTO and NAFTA harmonization mandates is
nothing less than a profound shift of regulatory activities away from a fairly open and accountable process
under the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act and other open government laws to international
organizations operating under extremely different rules regarding membership, governance, and
transparency with few provisions for public involvement. 
Codex Guidelines for Equivalency:  An internationally harmonized standard for determining the
equivalence of food regulations is being considered for final action at the Codex in July 2003. Given that
NAFTA and the WTO grant Codex standards a new role, as the world’s presumptively trade-legal
standards, a Codex equivalency rule could have a significant impact on any domestic food equivalency
rules developed by U.S. agencies which regulate food.
The development of internationally-harmonized equivalency rules in the Codex was accelerated at
the behest of the WTO. The promise of the establishment of these rules is being used by developed
nations as an inducement to get developing nations to go along with their demands in the wider,
multilateral negotiations now underway at the WTO.  Currently, developed nations are pushing for a319
major new WTO expansion, including the launch of negotiations of four new binding agreements covering
the so-called “Singapore issues” of procurement, competition, investment and trade facilitation. In
contrast, developing nations mainly oppose any expansion of WTO rules and seek full implementation of
the benefits they were promised in previous WTO agreements. At the 2001 WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Doha, Qatar, equivalency was officially listed as an implementation issue that would further existing WTO
commitments for more and speedier market access by developing countries, deserving the focused
attention of all WTO members.  While developed WTO member countries were willing to commit to320
deregulation in this context, potentially undermining public health and safety, they rejected market access
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concessions, such as steep cuts in the subsidies currently paid to agribusiness which effectively shut many
poor countries of food trade and undermine domestic food security in poor countries.
Later that year, the WTO’s SPS Committee issued an official communique to the Codex
Alimentarius demanding that it expedite international equivalency rules it had been working on for many
years.  The WTO’s involvement in the process clearly illustrates that the primary rationale for321
equivalency is one of trade facilitation. Ensuring a safe and wholesome food supply for the protection of
consumers around the world is a lesser concern. 
The Codex Guidelines on the Judgement of Equivalence were developed by the Codex
Committee on Food Import/Export Inspection and Certification Systems (CCFICS) and approved at its
December 2002 meeting in Adelaide, Australia.   The committee then forwarded the document for final322
action to the July Codex Alimentarius Commission General Meeting.
Codex defines equivalency as “the capability of different inspection and certification systems to
meet the same objectives.”  Equivalency agreements “may result in reducing the importing country’s323
rate of physical checks or sampling to test against standards or to avoid additional certification in the
country of origin.”  The Codex Guidelines establish a multi-step process for determining equivalence.324
However, the Guidelines are solely process-oriented and fail to cover key issues such as the types of
information that must be taken into account when determining equivalency. After multiple meetings, the
countries participating in CCFICS were unable to agree on the types of information to be taken into
account when judging equivalence and thus postponed this politically hot topic suggesting that such a list
could be developed later as an annex to the agreement.  Such a list should not only cover the specific325
aspects of meat slaughter and inspection standards to be compared, but also other aspects of law,
regulation and practice such as the adequacy of a nation’s SPS budget and a nation’s track record of
enforcement and product recalls. Without including this full range of comparisons, meat produced under
widely differing systems could be judged to be “equivalent” for trading purposes, undermining consumer
protection across the globe.
During its development, a number of U.S. and international consumer groups commented on the
significant shortcomings of the Codex proposal. In October 2002, Consumers International pressed
unsuccessfully for the development of at least three annexes to the agreement: the first would specify the
kinds of information requested by importing countries that would be used to make and maintain a judgment
of equivalence; the second would outline the terms for onsite visits by importing country authorities to
verify if and how the exporting countries’ application of SPS measures meets importing country
requirements; the third would specify the kinds of technical assistance to be provided by importing
countries to assist exporting countries in satisfying importing country requirements.  No such annexes326
were included in the final proposal.
Worse, the proposed Codex equivalency policy inappropriately creates a new limit on the criteria
and information that can be supplied and should be requested for the determination of equivalence “to that
which is necessary for this purpose.”  This clause inserts a new “necessity test” limiting the criteria that327
importing countries may want to utilize in a determination of equivalence, and practically encourages trade
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challenges against criteria deemed by an exporting nation to be more than strictly “necessary.” In the
context of WTO or NAFTA complaint, this language is likely to expose the judgement by a country’s food
safety experts about what is necessary, to second-guessing by trade officials operating in a closed trade
tribunal.328
Consumer groups also recommended that the Codex policy explicitly note that nations are free to
introduce and maintain domestic standards with a higher level of protection. In other words, countries are
not locked into Codex standards. In contrast, the Codex Guidelines state that “to facilitate a judgement of
equivalence between countries and promote harmonization of food safety standards, Codex member
nations should base their sanitary measures on Codex standards and related texts.”  The ability of329
countries to maintain different standards under constraining WTO rules is only referenced in a footnote to
this text. Given that Codex sanitary standards regarding meat inspection contain significant deviations
from U.S. law, (Codex meat inspection standards, for instance, allow company self-inspection of meat),330
a requirement to rely on international standards raises the specter of the U.S. being required to determine
equivalency with countries that do not have the budget to pay for government meat inspectors, and
therefore rely on the food industry to police itself or face WTO or NAFTA trade challenges for failing to
do so.
Finally, while the equivalency procedure seems to be a cooperative one between importing and
exporting nations, in fact, it could cause an enormous resource drain on importing countries. Importing
countries are obligated to engage in lengthy equivalency negotiations with any WTO or Codex member
country that asks to initiate this process. If the importing country ultimately refuses to establish an
equivalency agreement, that decision could be challenged under WTO rules.
The existence of the Codex Guidelines not only may have ramifications for every U.S. agency
that deals in food, but it will have significant ramifications for consumers around the globe. Nations
without their own policy on equivalency will be pressured to utilize the Codex’s vague process on
equivalency. Nations with more stringent domestic equivalency processes could be challenged at the
WTO for creating barriers to trade given the weaker Codex rules. In other words, if a nation is denied an
equivalency agreement with any other nation and decides to challenge that determination in the binding
dispute resolution bodies of the WTO or NAFTA, that nation’s process for determining equivalency could
itself become a WTO-adjudicable issue over and above whatever specific sanitary measures or meat
inspection standards were at issue.
An international harmonized policy on equivalency will serve no purpose except to undermine
domestic, democratically-achieved equivalency policies. Rather than promoting such a weak policy in the
Codex, the U.S. Codex delegation should have postponed action on an international equivalency policy
until a domestic policy was agreed upon after formal rulemaking.
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APPENDIX B:  
U.S. AGENCIES STRUGGLE WITH EQUIVALENCY
The following examples illustrate the problems with how the concept of equivalence is being
implemented in U.S. law and regulation, particularly with regard to the maintenance of the domestic
system for accountability and public participation in agency decisionmaking provided for in the
Administrative Procedures Act and other open-government laws.  U.S. federal agencies are failing to
develop consistent procedures for notifying the public and incorporating public comment in equivalency
decisionmaking.
FSIS Equivalence: As noted above, the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act in 1994
resulted in changes to U.S. import regulations when the words “equal to” were replaced with the word
“equivalent.” All other criteria for the importation of meat laid out in the regulations remained the same.
Shortly thereafter, FSIS decided that all 37 countries that had previously been certified by FSIS as eligible
to export meat to the U.S. under a standard requiring importing governments to adopt identical meat
inspection standards were at least “equivalent” to U.S. standards.  In other words, these countries were331
automatically judged to be equivalent and grandfathered in without further analysis. It was not until four
years later, in 1999, that FSIS published draft criteria for making equivalency determinations.  USDA332
responded to public comments on this policy in December 1999, but never promulgated the policy as a
formal binding rule.  Moreover, the FSIS policy does not specify on what basis FSIS will determine333
alternative sanitary measures equivalent, does not create a policy for terminating equivalency, and leaves
an unacceptable amount of room for judgment calls by USDA officials.
In a public meeting on April 14, 1999, USDA officials explained that the agency had decided that
formal international agreements were not needed to engage in equivalency.  Instead the agency would334
announce that it would make “determinations” pursuant to the importation criteria laid out in 9 CFR
§327.2 and formalize those decisions via notice and comment rulemaking in the Federal Register. The
agency also conducts formal rulemaking on an “initial” determination of equivalence, because it has been
agency practice to list nations certified to export and now “equivalent” nations in the Code of Federal
Regulations. So for example, in 2001, the agency initiated formal rulemaking on a draft equivalency
proposal for the newly constituted nation of Slovakia, but no final action has been taken on that
determination due to the detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in that region.  335
However, the agency has decided not to provide public notice of  “continuing” equivalency
decisions with trading partners once determined eligible to export even though these nations may undergo
changes in their regulatory structures, and their eligibility for equivalency is supposed to be assessed
annually.  This means that the USDA does not consult the public on its decisions regarding whether a336
nation’s equivalency status should be extended and the agency fails to notify the public when problems
are found with trading partners violating U.S. law or utilizing standards different than those required by
U.S. law.  
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The agency also announced that it would provide public notice (but not necessarily formal
rulemaking) when a nation determined equivalent made a significant change in its regulatory system.337
For instance, the agency published a “notice” in the Federal Register seeking comment when Australia
(which had previously been found eligible to export to the U.S.) sought equivalency for a new pilot project
for meat inspection that replaced federal meat inspectors with company employees.  Some months later,338
USDA posted a “notice of equivalency” stating that the Australian program had been deemed to be
equivalent with modifications.  In 1999, the agency posted notice that it was evaluating a new Canadian339
program covering chicken, turkey and other fowl that greatly reduced the role of government
inspection.  However, perhaps due to a U.S. court ruling highly critical of a similar privatization scheme340
here, no further action was taken on Canadian proposal. 
When the USDA initiated its Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) program
aimed at countering microbial contamination of meat in 1996, it notified trading partners that they needed
to implement a similar program for exports to maintain eligibility to export into the U.S. In December
1999, USDA analyzed the HACCP systems of 37 nations and without first giving public notice in the
Federal Register, approved 32 as having equivalent implementation of their HACCP systems.  Although341
HACCP, which implicates hundreds of individual sanitary standards, surely constituted a “significant”
change meriting prior public notice and consultation, FSIS did not provide the public with advance notice
of these important negotiations, arguing that this was not necessary as the countries’ inspection systems
already had been approved as equivalent. In 2000, the U.S. Office of the Inspector General issued a
scathing critique of the manner in which FSIS handled these equivalency decisions, which is reviewed at
greater length later in the body of this report. 
National Organic Program Equivalency: The 1990 Organic Foods Production Act authorized
the development of a National Organic Program (NOP) which would outline the criteria for determining
what products can be labeled and sold as “organic” foods in the U.S.  After years of discussion and342
debate, including a extensive notice and comment rulemaking in the Federal Register, the NOP went into
effect in October 2002.
While the program was created with extensive public participation, a little-noticed provision in the
regulation allowed for equivalency determinations regarding the organic programs of other countries. The
regulation allows for food to enter the U.S. and be labeled organic if a foreign certifying agent approves
the food as “organic” per the exporting country’s standards and if the foreign government authority that
accredited the certifying agent “acted under an equivalency agreement with the United States.”   In343
other words, organic foods meeting exporting country requirements, but not necessarily U.S. organic
standards can be sold in the U.S. and labeled “organic.”
Although USDA initially announced that it was weighing the benefits of a public meeting to
determine how to carry out equivalence “in the true spirit of transparency,”  it has instead launched into344
negotiations with a number of countries including India, Japan, Australia and the European Union (EU),
before developing an equivalence process regarding organic food standards informed by public
participation.345
The WTO Comes to Dinner: U.S. Implementation of Trade Rules Bypasses Food Safety Requirements
41
In the context of its ongoing negotiations with the EU, USDA’s National Organic Standards
Board (NOSB) published a set of proposed criteria to be used for determining equivalence in April 2002
including: 1) is the regulation consistent with U.S. objectives, as stated in the NOSB Principles of Organic
Production and Handling?; 2) would recognition of the regulation as equivalent have any negative impacts
on domestic producers or handlers?; 3) does the foreign regulation meet the expectations of domestic
consumers?; and 4) are there environmental management requirements unique to the exporting
country?346
Comparison of the U.S. and EU organic standards reveals a number of substantive differences,
including differences regarding whether food produced using sewage sludge as fertilizer and antibiotics
qualify as organic. These two issues among others prompted massive public outcry to the initial U.S.
proposed rule which resulted in those measures being dropped from the final proposal. Yet, the measures
are being reconsidered as part of the U.S.-EU equivalency negotiations. There are a number of
differences between U.S. and EU organic standards: 
U.S. Organic Standard EU Organic Standard
•   Sewage sludge prohibited •   Sewage sludge permitted
•   Lumber treated with arsenate prohibited •   Lumber treated with arsenate permitted
•   Livestock feed must be 100 % organic •   Feed may be 60% “in-conversion” and 
   25% conventional
•   Antibiotic use prohibited • Antibiotics allowed, with restrictions  347
To date, USDA has not determined any country equivalent in the organic food category. The very
notion of equivalency is particularly troubling in the context of the organic food rules given the very
purpose of the NOP 1990 Organic Foods Production Act is to assure “consumers that organically
produced products meet a consistent standard.”  The act was written to eliminate a perceived348
“patchwork” of organic standards that varied from state to state, and the USDA regulations consist of
150 pages of standards and requirements U.S. food producers in all sates must meet before their products
can be labeled “organic.” Yet, the U.S. regulations providing for equivalency determinations stand in
sharp contrast to the notion of consistency, as differing standards can be arbitrarily designated “the same”
for trade importation purposes. Having eliminated one patchwork of varying procedures and standards,
the regulation’s equivalency terms facilitate the creation of new international patchwork of differing
standards which can be declared “equivalent”– and receive the same U.S. “organic” label. 
While the NOSB has stated in a draft document seeking public comment on the U.S.-EU organic
equivalency discussions that the program will use notice and comment rulemaking before finalizing its
equivalency determinations, in line with USDA’s practice for certifying countries to export to the U.S.,
this is hardly reassuring.  While public notice is always a desired minimum for public participation, in this349
instance, hundreds of thousands of producers and consumers participated in the creation of the National
Organic Program. When the regulations were finalized they thought their job was done. In reality, very
few of these small farmers and consumers have the ability to monitor the Federal Register and weigh-in
on each international negotiation. As a consequence USDA may declare alternate standards, even on
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issues as hotly contested as sewage sludge, “equivalent” and thus establish an alternate regulatory system
for organic imports.
FDA Equivalence: FDA’s statutes and regulatory structure with regard to imports differs
greatly from USDA’s. Until the 2002 Bioterrorism Act, most foods falling under FDA authority were
simply shipped to the U.S. from plants all over the world, only a small fraction of which FDA officials
were able to inspect. Now, per the requirements of the new law, by December 2003 foreign plants must
pre-register and notify FDA of incoming shipments. Although following the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, FDA received new funds for border inspection, the agency will only be able to increase border
inspection activities from .6% of imports in 2001 to a projected 1.3% of imports in 2003.350
It is worth noting at the outset that the FDA has a long history of entering into simple compliance
agreements. FDA has negotiated more than 50 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with foreign
governments that commit these governments to meeting U.S. standards before exporting food and other
products under the agency’s jurisdiction to the U.S. 
Additionally, FDA has been involved in a protracted equivalency negotiation with Europe
regarding good manufacturing practices for pharmaceuticals under the auspices of a 1998 U.S.-EU
Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA). Because this agreement deals with non-food product standards,
it falls under WTO TBT Agreement rules. The pharmaceutical MRA is a significant cause of
transatlantic friction and is years behind its implementation schedule primarily because FDA has found it
labor-intensive and time consuming to approve other countries’ regulatory systems as “equivalent.” After
five years, no country has yet been determined equivalent although a great deal of staff time and money
has been spent attempting to implement the agreement. FDA’s go-slow approach in product equivalency
stands in sharp contrast to USDA’s enthusiastic embrace of the concept.
FDA has engaged in food equivalency discussions, but has never developed a formal food
equivalency policy. FDA issued a “notice” of a draft equivalency process in 1997, but never formalized
the policy as a final rule.  To our knowledge, FDA has not used its draft procedure to determine any351
food inspection system equivalent to that of the United States.
Although it has not yet finalized and promulgated its own rule on equivalency, FDA was a leader
in the effort to promulgate the international equivalency guidelines at the Codex Alimentarius discussed in
Appendix A. FDA has said it would rely on the Codex Guidelines once finalized and approved, but has
not specified in what manner, i.e. if the agency will adopt the Codex Guidelines as a guidance or a
regulation or take no formal action at all.  352
The proposed Codex policy is significantly less consumer protective than the draft equivalency
policy published by FDA in 1997. In July 2002, the Washington-based consumer group Center for Science
in the Public Interest (CSPI) sent a letter to the FDA, which leads the U.S. delegation for the Codex
Committee in charge of developing the Codex Guidelines, pointing out the differences between the two
proposals.  The 1997 FDA draft policy clearly stated that to assure that imported foods were as safe353
and wholesome as domestically-produced foods, U.S. standards “would not be relaxed to facilitate a
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finding of equivalence.”  By contrast, the Codex Guidelines do not provide any assurances that354
domestic standards will not be relaxed. In addition, the FDA draft policy requires ongoing verification,
including import checks at the border, while the Codex Guidelines states that “importing parties may be
able to reduce the frequency and extent of verification measures following a judgement of
equivalence.”  The FDA draft policy states that the U.S. will conduct one or more on-site visits to verify355
that foreign regulatory systems, including plant inspection systems, are functioning as indicated in paper
reviews. Rather than recommending that such site visits be a regular part of verification and monitoring,
the Codex Guidelines merely suggest that exporting country provide access to enable its inspection
systems to be examined by the importing party.356
Unlike other federal agencies, FDA is required by the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act to
conduct formal rulemaking before declaring countries SPS measures equivalent under FDA statutes.357
The Act requires the FDA to publish a proposed regulation when it wants to declare a foreign food
standard “equivalent,” disclosing the basis of the proposed determination, providing the public with an
opportunity to comment on the proposal, and taking into account the comments received in making the
final decision.  In contrast, Codex Guidelines merely suggest that governments consult with interested358
parties “to the extent practical and reasonable,”  providing no assurances that consumers or other359
interested parties will truly have a voice in the process. Unfortunately, FDA has announced that it does
not feel obliged to engage in notice and comment rulemaking when equivalency decisions are reached
under the WTO’s TBT agreement, although the public health implications of determining equivalency in
the pharmaceutical products area are just as much of a concern as equivalency in the food products
area.360
Many consumer advocates believe that FDA’s eagerness to assist in the development of an
international policy before developing its own policy on food equivalence reveals the systematic
prioritization of trade facilitation goals over public health goals. If the agency were interested in protecting
the health of American consumers as its first priority, then it seems reasonable that it would develop a
domestic policy aimed at achieving that goal first. If, however, the agency’s primary interest is promoting
trade, the latter makes sense.
APHIS Equivalency: USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has no publicly
available equivalency policy or any policy for public involvement in equivalency decisionmaking, but is
engaged in at least two equivalency negotiations nonetheless. On July 20, 1999 the U.S. and the European
Commission signed a far-reaching agreement concerning trade in animals and animal products affecting
over $1.5 billion in U.S. exports annually.  Called a Veterinary Equivalency Agreement or VEA, major361
products covered include: live animals, meat and edible meat offal, fish and crustaceans, molluscs and
other aquatic invertebrates, dairy produce, birds’ eggs, natural honey, margarine, a variety of animal fats
and oils, pasta, soups and broths, ice cream, flours, meals and pellets, animal blood, glands and other
animal organs, animal or vegetable fertilizers, casein, gelatins, peptones, enzymes, raw hides, skins and fur
skins of animals, wool, and fine or coarse animal hair.  Considering the scope of products covered by362
the VEA, a number of U.S. regulatory agencies will play a role in its implementation, including USDA,
FDA and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
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The VEA outlines a four step process for determining the equivalence of U.S. and EU standards
in over 40 product areas, although to date equivalency has not been achieved in any product area. Article
7 of the VEA requires that: 1) The parties identify the sanitary measure for which equivalence is sought;
2) the importing party explains the objective of the sanitary measure; 3) the exporting party demonstrates
that its sanitary measure achieves the importing party’s appropriate level of protection; and 4) the
importing party analyzes the supplied information.  The type of information analyzed includes risks363
identified by the importing party, provisions within the exporting party’s legislation regarding standards,
procedures, policies, infrastructure, the resources and relative power of the exporting party to enforce
these controls, and evidence from the exporting party as to the efficacy of its enforcement controls.364
An important aspect of the VEA, which resulted in changes to U.S. domestic regulatory policy,
involves the issue of determining what regions are free of certain animal diseases and therefore eligible to
export. Article 6 of the VEA requires that “the importing Party shall recognize for trade the health status
of regions, as determined by the exporting Party.”  This tracks the internationally-harmonized standards365
set by the International Office of Epizootics, the WTO-recognized veterinary standard-setting institution
based in Paris, but represents a significant shift in pre-existing U.S. policy. Prior to the equivalency
agreement, when there was an outbreak of an animal disease in a European country, the U.S. would
commonly ban imports from the entire country. Now, under the regionalization rules of the VEA,
European officials are supposed to determine the sub-national region which is diseased and from which
products can be banned, and the U.S. is required to comply with that determination. On October 28, 1997,
APHIS issued a final rule implementing the changes to U.S. regulations needed to fulfill the
regionalization requirements of the VEA before it was even signed.  366
There are significant problems associated with the regionalization approach. For instance,
importing parties need assurance that federal and sub-federal veterinary authorities will honestly and
promptly report potentially devastating diseases. Yet routine experience tells us that this does not always
occur. 
 
According to APHIS, the VEA was negotiated for six years before it was finalized,  yet in the367
U.S., there were no public meetings, nor a single congressional hearing on the matter and no agency
involved solicited public comment on the negotiations in the Federal Register. It has yet to be seen
whether or how agencies will notify the public when specific equivalency determinations are made in
each of the 40-plus product areas covered by the agreement.
In addition to the veterinary equivalency agreement, APHIS is engaged in equivalency
negotiations in another area although APHIS has no overall policy on equivalency, has not developed a list
of criteria that will be used to judge equivalence and apparently has no plans to do so.  The agency is368
currently preparing to declare foreign irradiation facilities as technically equivalent to U.S. facilities under
the WTO TBT Agreement to enable them to irradiate certain fruits and vegetables intended for export to
the United States to eradicate pests.  It is not clear why this is classified solely as a technical or TBT369
issue dealing with the facilities themselves, when the irradiated fruits and vegetables are headed for the
U.S. market and to the dinner tables of U.S. consumers. 
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NHTSA Equivalency: The National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration is also
engaged in equivalency under the WTO TBT Agreement. The agency regularly reviews petitions to
incorporate foreign standards as “equivalent” to U.S. vehicle safety standards, giving manufacturers in the
U.S. the option of using either. While an examination of TBT equivalency is beyond the scope of this
paper, the manner in which NHTSA is handling equivalency is worth mentioning because it has gone
farther than any agency in attempting to promulgate a formal process for equivalency and to develop a
separate policy for incorporating public comment into the process. NHTSA gave public notice and
accepted public comment on both policies in the Federal Register.
NHTSA is the only federal agency to have performed formal rulemaking to establish its
harmonization and equivalency procedure. After soliciting public comment and responding to it on the
record, it issued a final rule in May 1998 which incorporates a number of helpful elements.   First, the370
NHTSA policy clearly states that its practice will be to identify and adopt those foreign vehicle safety
standards that “clearly reflect best practices i.e., that require significantly higher levels of safety
performance.”  Second, “if resource limitations make it necessary to choose between competing371
petitions [for amendment of standards], the agency will give priority to granting a petition asking the
agency to upgrade one of its standards to the level of a superior foreign standard over granting another
petition simply asking the agency to add a compliance alternative.”  Third, every petition to amend a372
NHTSA vehicle safety standard must be accompanied by appropriate data and an analysis of the relative
benefits of the NHTSA and foreign standards meaning that NHTSA places the burden of proof on the
petitioner by requiring the petitioner to supply the data and analysis to support the petition.  Fourth, if the373
agency tentatively decides that a foreign standard is functionally equivalent or better than a NHTSA
standard, the agency will issue a notice of proposed rulemaking and request public comment on the
tentative determination and the proposed amendment.  Finally, the agency explicitly affirms that any374
final rule to amend a NHTSA standard will be made in accordance with the applicable law of the United
States and “only after careful consideration and analysis of the public comments.”  Under this process,375
NHTSA has already turned down a number of equivalency petitions such as one for windshield wipers
that they believe were an unacceptable abrogation of a U.S. standard.
It is notable that FSIS felt comfortable analyzing the hundreds of sanitary standards that go into a
HACCP program and declaring these complicated programs “equivalent” without prior notice and
comment rulemaking on the equivalency negotiations. Meanwhile, NHTSA regularly employs rulemaking
simply when considering the equivalence of a single standard. At a minimum, all U.S. agencies should
have formal policies promulgated as a binding rule regarding how they will undertake the process of
equivalency decisionmaking and how they will incorporate the public in this process.  A model
Administrative Procedures Act policy for equivalency decisionmaking is attached as Appendix C of this
report.
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APPENDIX C: 
MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING PROCEDURE FOR
AGENCIES RE: INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION,
EQUIVALENCE, AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION
Prior to engaging in international harmonization activities, mutual recognition agreements, or
equivalence determinations, each agency should follow existing rule-making procedures to promulgate a
formal rule setting forth procedures to be followed to assure such public input and involvement as are
reasonable and as required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Sunshine Act or other applicable law.  The agency
rule should incorporate the following procedures.
I.  Harmonization
Each agency involved in harmonization activities should invite and facilitate public participation
concerning the proposals for the international harmonization of U.S. regulations and standards of
other nations or those being developed by international standard-setting organizations by:
1. publishing once each year in the Federal Register the agency’s plans for harmonization
activities in the following year and providing an opportunity for interested parties to comment
on the substance of the standards, the prioritization of agency resources used on such
activities, and to submit particular proposals or ideas for agency consideration.
2. prior to the agency’s engagement in a specific harmonization activity
a. publishing in the Federal Register any proposed harmonized standard, all subjects
for negotiation, and any proposed U.S. position for such negotiations, including
(i) reference to the legal authority under which the activity is proceeding;
(ii) a description of the subjects and issues involved, the nations involved, a
discussion of the potential U.S.  public benefit of the harmonization activity,
whether the proposed harmonization activity could result in a level of
protection higher or lower than existing U.S.  regulations or standards, and
whether U.S. law encourages or authorizes harmonization in this instance;
and,
(iii) the extent to which non-governmental parties will participate in the process
             and the applicability of FACA.
b. preparing an environmental assessment for any harmonization activity likely to affect
the environment; and 
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c. inviting interested parties to comment on the proposed standard, and the U.S.
position on the standard and to attend a public hearing on the proposal within the
comment period. The agency should respond to any comments on the record before
engaging in international harmonization negotiations.
3. during the pendency of the harmonization activity
a. publishing in the Federal Register or on the agency's website on a periodic basis a
description of the current status of all harmonization negotiations, draft documents
(where appropriate), and the timetable for future harmonization activities;
b. ensuring that the public has prompt and meaningful access to all documents that are
available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) relating to the
harmonization activity, including documents submitted by non-governmental entities
and foreign governments; and
c. if industry representatives are involved in the activity, undertaking to obtain the
participation of representatives of regulatory beneficiaries in any U.S. delegation,
including providing financial support for such representatives if needed to facilitate
their participation.
4. providing an additional notice and comment opportunity as provided in paragraph (2) if
material alterations in the activity cause the agency to substantively depart from the terms
or substance of the proposed regulation or standard or the previously stated U.S. position,
as originally noticed.  Any committees formed in the harmonization process should be treated
as administrative committees for purposes of U.S. law.
II.  Equivalency Determinations
Agencies should invite and facilitate public participation concerning equivalency determinations by:
5. publishing in the Federal Register
a.  notice of any petition or request for an equivalence determination from a foreign
government;
b. early notice of U.S. agency intent regarding each requested or proposed equivalency
agreement, including an explanation of: the agency’s statutory authority to undertake
equivalence; the criteria that will be used to determine equivalence; any risk
assessments or applicable studies; an analysis of benefits for the U.S. public and risk
posed by  such an equivalency decision; an explanation of the findings that the
measure provides the same or greater level of consumer protection as the
counterpart domestic measure;
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c. early notice inviting interested persons to comment on a proposed equivalency
determination and to attend a public hearing on the proposal within the comment
period. Agencies should respond to any comments on the record before making a
final equivalency determination;
d. if applicable, a draft of the agreement, before the agreement has been signed on
behalf of the agency.
6.  before entering into the equivalency decision, preparing an environmental impact
statement for any determination likely to affect the environment.
7. providing for an open docket to facilitate public comment during the implementation period.
8. publishing a report on the functioning of any equivalency determination after two years of
implementation and operation, and on a periodic basis thereafter.
III.  Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)
Agencies should invite and facilitate public participation concerning MRAs by:
9. publishing in the Federal Register 
a. notice of any petition or request that a U.S. agency negotiate or enter into an MRA;
 
b. notice of any decision by the agency to request a foreign government to negotiate
or enter into an MRA;
c.  early notice of U.S. agency intent regarding each requested or proposed MRA
including an explanation of: the agency’s statutory authority to undertake MRAs;
any risk assessments or applicable studies; an analysis of benefits for the U.S. public
and risk posed by  such an agreement; an explanation of the findings that the MRA
provides the same or greater level of consumer protection as the counterpart
procedure formerly utilized by the agency;
d. early notice inviting interested persons to comment on a proposed or negotiated
MRA and to attend a public hearing on the matter within the comment period.
Agencies should respond on the record to any comments about the proposed MRA;.
e. a draft of the MRA, before the MRA has been signed on behalf of the agency.
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10. before entering into an MRA, an environmental impact statement for any proposed MRA
likely to affect the environment.
11. providing for an open docket during the implementation period.
12. a report on the functioning of any MRA two years after implementation.
IV.   Guiding Principles
Agencies should develop guiding principles for their harmonization activities and accept public comment with
proceedings to formulate those principles. Agencies should decline to participate in international harmonization
activities that are not governmental in nature, conducted without public notice of such activities and/or that
do not permit public observers. Agencies should not recognize international standards that are developed with
proceedings that do not allow for public notice and input. Agencies should view U.S. laws and regulations as
a floor for negotiations and should not allow for the development of international standards lower than U.S.
standards.  
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